Category Archives: Colonization

The Pitfalls of National Consciousness

Frantz Fanon
Frantz Fanon

The Wretched Of The Earth.
The Pitfalls of National Consciousness”

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History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism. For a very long time the native devotes his energies to ending certain definite abuses: forced labor, corporal punishment, inequality of salaries, limitation of political rights, etc. This fight for democracy against the oppression of mankind will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge, sometimes laboriously, as a claim to nationhood. It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and, let it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps.
National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. The faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the

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state. These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression, that is so harmful and prejudicial to national effort and national unity. We shall see that such retrograde steps with all the weaknesses and serious dangers that they entail are the historical result of the incapacity of the national middle class to rationalize popular action, that is to say their incapacity to see into the reasons for that action.
This traditional weakness, which is almost congenital to the national consciousness of underdeveloped countries, is not solely the result of the mutilation of the colonized people by the colonial regime. It is also the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mold that its mind is set in.
The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country. But that same independence which literally drives it into a corner will give rise within its ranks to catastrophic reactions, and will oblige it to send out frenzied appeals for help to the former mother country. The university and merchant classes which make up the most enlightened section of the new state are in fact characterized by the smallness of their number and their being concentrated in the capital, and the type of activities in which they are engaged: business, agriculture, and the liberal professions. Neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be found within this national middle class. The national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is not engaged in production, nor in invention, nor building, nor

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labor; it is completely canalized into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry; and it is only too true that the greed of the settlers and the system of embargoes set up by colonialism have hardly left them any other choice.
Under the colonial system, a middle class which accumulates capital is an impossible phenomenon. Now, precisely, it would seem that the historical vocation of an authentic national middle class in an underdeveloped country is to repudiate its own nature in so far it as it is bourgeois, that is to say in so far as it is the tool of capitalism, and to make itself the willing slave of that revolutionary capital which is the people.
In an underdeveloped country an authentic national middle class ought to consider as its bounden duty to betray the calling fate has marked out for it, and to put itself to school with the people: in other words to put at the people’s disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has snatched when going through the colonial universities. But unhappily we shall see that very often the national middle class does not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful, and just path; rather, it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways—shocking because anti-national—of a traditional bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois.
The objective of nationalist parties as from a certain given period is, we have seen, strictly national. They mobilize the people with slogans of independence, and for the rest leave it to future events. When such parties are questioned on the economic program of the state that they are clamoring for, or on the nature of the regime which they propose to install, they are incapable of replying, be-

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cause, precisely, they are completely ignorant of the economy of their own country.
This economy has always developed outside the limits of their knowledge. They have nothing more than an approximate, bookish acquaintance with the actual and potential resources of their country’s soil and mineral deposits; and therefore they can only speak of these resources on a general and abstract plane. After independence this underdeveloped middle class, reduced in numbers and without capital, which refuses to follow the path of revolution, will fall into deplorable stagnation. It is unable to give free rein to its genius, which formerly it was wont to lament, though rather too glibly, was held in check by colonial domination. The precariousness of its resources and the paucity of its managerial class force it back for years into an artisan economy. From its point of view, which is inevitably a very limited one, a national economy is an economy based on what may be called local products. Long speeches will be made about the artisan class. Since the middle classes find it impossible to set up factories that would be more profit-earning both for themselves and for the country as a whole, they will surround the artisan class with a chauvinistic tenderness in keeping with the new awareness of national dignity, and which moreover will bring them in quite a lot of money. This cult of local products and this incapability to seek out new systems of management will be equally manifested by the bogging down of the national middle class in the methods of agri­
cultural production which were characteristic of the colonial period.
The national economy of the period of independence is not set on a new footing. It is still concerned with the groundnut harvest, with the cocoa crop and the olive yield. In the same way there is no change in the marketing of basic products, and not a single industry is set up in the

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country. We go on sending out raw materials; we go on being Europe’s small farmers, who specialize in unfinished products.
Yet the national middle class constantly demands the nationalization of the economy and of the trading sectors. This is because, from their point of view, nationalization does not mean placing the whole economy at the service of the nation and deciding to satisfy the needs of the nation. For them, nationalization does not mean governing the state with regard to the new social relations whose growth it has been decided to encourage. To them, nationalization quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period.
Since the middle class has neither sufficient material nor intellectual resources (by intellectual resources we mean engineers and technicians), it limits its claims to the taking over of business offices and commercial houses formerly occupied by the settlers. The national bourgeoisie steps into the shoes of the former European settlement: doctors, barristers, traders, commercial travelers, general agents, and transport agents. It considers that the dignity of the country and its own welfare require that it should occupy all these posts. From now on it will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands, whether these companies wish to keep on their connections with the country, or to open it up. The national middle class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary.
Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neocolonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s

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business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner. But this same lucrative role, this cheap-Jack’s function, this meanness of outlook and this absence of all ambition symbolize the incapability of the national middle class to fulfill its historic role of bourgeoisie. Here, the dynamic, pioneer aspect, the characteristics of the inventor and of the discoverer of new worlds which are found in all national bourgeoisies are lamentably absent. In the colonial countries, the spirit of indulgence is dominant at the core of the bourgeoisie; and this is because the national bourgeoisie identifies itself with the Western bourgeoisie, from whom it has leamt its lessons. It follows the Western bourgeoisie along its path of negation and decadence without ever having emulated it in its first stages of exploration and invention, stages which are an acquisition of that Western bourgeoisie whatever the circumstances. In its beginnings, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West. We need not think that it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is already senile before it has come to know the petulance, the fearlessness, or the will to succeed of youth.
The national bourgeoisie will be greatly helped on its way toward decadence by the Western bourgeoisies, who come to it as tourists avid for the exotic, for big game hunting, and for casinos. The national bourgeoisie organizes centers of rest and relaxation and pleasure resorts to meet the wishes of the Western bourgeoisie. Such activity is given the name of tourism, and for the occasion will be built up as a national industry. If proof is needed of the eventual transformation of certain elements of the ex-native bourgeoisie into the organizers of parties for their Western opposite numbers, it is worth while having a look at what has happened in Latin America. The casi-

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nos of Havana and of Mexico, the beaches of Rio, the little Brazilian and Mexican girls, the half-breed thirteen- year-olds, the ports of Acapulco and Copacabana—all these are the stigma of this depravation of the national middle class. Because it is bereft of ideas, because it lives to itself and cuts itself off from the people, undermined by its hereditary incapacity to think in terms of all the problems of the nation as seen from the point of view of the whole of that nation, the national middle class will have nothing better to do than to take on the role of manager for Western enterprise, and it will in practice set up its country as the brothel of Europe.
Once again we must keep before us the unfortunate example of certain Latin American republics. The banking magnates, the technocrats, and the big businessmen of the United States have only to step onto a plane and they are wafted into subtropical climes, there for a space of a week or ten days to luxuriate in the delicious depravities which their “reserves” hold for them.
The behavior of the national landed proprietors is practically identical with that of the middle classes of the towns. The big farmers have, as soon as independence is proclaimed, demanded the nationalization of agricultural production. Through manifold scheming practices they manage to make a clean sweep of the farms formerly owned by settlers, thus reinforcing their hold on the district. But they do not try to introduce new agricultural methods, nor to farm more intensively, nor to integrate their farming systems into a genuinely national economy.
In fact, the landed proprietors will insist that the state should give them a hundred times more facilities and privileges than were enjoyed by the foreign settlers in former times. The exploitation of agricultural workers will be intensified and made legitimate. Using two or three slogans, these new colonists will demand an enormous

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amount of work from the agricultural laborers, in the name of the national effort of course. There will be no modernization of agriculture, no planning for development, and no initiative; for initiative throws these people into a panic since it implies a minimum of risk, and completely upsets the hesitant, prudent, landed bourgeoisie, which gradually slips more and more into the lines laid down by colonialism. In the districts where this is the case, the only efforts made to better things are due to the government; it orders them, encourages them, and finances them. The landed bourgeoisie refuses to take the slightest risk, and remains opposed to any venture and to any hazard. It has no intention of building upon sand; it demands solid investments and quick returns. The enormous profits which it pockets, enormous if we take into account the national revenue, are never reinvested. The money-in-the-stocking mentality is dominant in the psychology of these landed proprietors. Sometimes, especially in the years immediately following independence, the bourgeoisie does not hesitate to invest in foreign banks the profits that it makes out of its native soil. On the other hand large sums are spent on display: on cars, country houses, and on all those things which have been justly described by economists as characterizing an underdeveloped bourgeoi­sie.
We have said that the native bourgeoisie which comes to power uses its class aggressiveness to corner the positions formerly kept for foreigners. On the morrow of independence, in fact, it violently attacks colonial personalities: barristers, traders, landed proprietors, doctors, and higher civil servants. It will fight to the bitter end against these people “who insult our dignity as a nation.” It waves aloft the notion of the nationalization and Africanization of the ruling classes. The fact is that such action will become more and more tinged by racism, until the

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bourgeoisie bluntly puts the problem to the government by saying “We must have these posts.” They will not stop their snarling until they have taken over everyone.
The working class of the towns, the masses of unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans. In the Ivory Coast, the anti-Dahoman and anti-Voltaic troubles are in fact racial riots. The Dahoman and Voltaic peoples, who control the greater part of the petty trade, are, once independence is declared, the object of hostile manifestations on the part of the people of the Ivory Coast. From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact the government of the Ivory Coast commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction. In Senegal it is the anti-Soudanese demonstrations which called forth these words from Mr. Mamadou Dia:

The truth is that the Senegalese people have only adopted the Mali mystique through attachment to its leaders. Their adhesion to the Mali has no other significance than that of a fresh act of faith in the political policy of the latter. The Senegalese territory was no less real, in fact it was all the more so in that the presence of the Soudanese in Dakar was too obviously manifested for it to be forgotten. It is this fact which explains that, far from being regretted, the break-up of the Federation has been greeted with relief by the mass of
the people and nowhere was a hand raised to maintain it*.

While certain sections of the Senegalese people jump

*Mamadou Dia, Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale, p. 140.

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at the chance which is afforded them by their own leaders to get rid of the Soudanese, who hamper them in commercial matters or in administrative posts, the Congolese, who stood by hardly daring to believe in the mass exodus of the Belgians, decide to bring pressure to bear on the Senegalese who have settled in Léopoldville and Elisabethville and to get them to leave.
As we see it, the mechanism is identical in the two sets of circumstances. If the Europeans get in the way of the intellectuals and business bourgeoisie of the young nation, for the mass of the people in the towns competition is represented principally by Africans of another nation. On the Ivory Coast these competitors are the Dahomeans; in Ghana they are the Nigerians; in Senegal, they are the Soudanese.
When the bourgeoisie’s demands for a ruling class made up exclusively of Negroes or Arabs do not spring from an authentic movement of nationalization but merely correspond to an anxiety to place in the bourgeoisie’s hands the power held hitherto by the foreigner, the masses on their level present the same demands, confining however the notion of Negro or Arab within certain territorial limits. Between resounding assertions of the unity of the continent and this behavior of the masses which has its inspiration in their leaders, many different attitudes may be traced. We observe a permanent seesaw between African unity, which fades quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion, and a heartbreaking return to chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form.
On the Senegalese side, the leaders who have been the main theoreticians of African unity, and who several times over have sacrificed their local political organizations and their personal positions to this idea, are, though in all good faith, undeniably responsible. Their mistake—our mistake— has been, under pretext of fighting “Balkanization,” not to

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have taken into consideration the pre-colonial fact of terri- torialism. Our mistake has been not to have paid enough attention in our analyses to this phenomenon, which is the fruit of colonialism if you like, but also a sociological fact which no theory of unity, be it ever so laudable or attractive, can abolish. We have allowed ourselves to be seduced by a mirage: that of the structure which is the most pleasing to our minds; and, mistaking our ideal for reality, we have believed it enough to condemn territorialism, and its natural sequel, micro-nationalism, for us to get the better of them, and to assure the success of our chimerical undertaking*.
From the chauvinism of the Senegalese to the tribalism of the Yolofs is not a big step. For in fact, everywhere that the national bourgeoisie has failed to break through to the people as a whole, to enlighten them, and to consider all problems in the first place with regard to them—a failure due to the bourgeoisie’s attitude of mistrust and to the haziness of its political tenets—everywhere that national bourgeoisie has shown itself incapable of extending its vision of the world sufficiently, we observe a falling back toward old tribal attitudes, and, furious and sick at heart, we perceive that race feeling in its most exacerbated form is triumphing. Since the sole motto of the bourgeoisie is “Replace the foreigner,” and because it hastens in every walk of life to secure justice for itself and to take over the posts that the foreigner has vacated, the “small people” of the nation—taxi drivers, cake sellers, and bootblacks—will be equally quick to insist that the Dahomeans go home to their own country, or will even go further and demand that the Foulbis and the Peuhls return to their jungle or their mountains.
It is from this viewpoint that we must interpret the fact that in young, independent countries, here and there federalism triumphs. We know that colonial domination

* Mamadou Dia, op. cit.

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has marked certain regions out for privilege. The colony’s economy is not integrated into that of the nation as a whole. It is still organized in order to complete the economy of the different mother countries. Colonialism hardly ever exploits the whole of a country. It contents itself with bringing to light the natural resources, which it extracts, and exports to meet the needs of the mother country’s industries, thereby allowing certain sectors of the colony to become relatively rich. But the rest of the colony follows its path of underdevelopment and poverty, or at all events sinks into it more deeply.
Immediately after independence, the nationals who live in the more prosperous regions realize their good luck, and show a primary and profound reaction in refusing to feed the other nationals. The districts which are rich in groundnuts’, in cocoa, and in diamonds come to the forefront, and dominate the empty panorama which the rest of the nation presents. The nationals of these rich regions look upon the others with hatred, and find in them envy and covetousness, and homicidal impulses. Old rivalries which were there before colonialism, old interracial hatreds
come to the surface. The Balubas refuse to feed the Luluas; Katanga forms itself into a state; and Albert Kalondji gets himself crowned king of South Kasai.
African unity, that vague formula, yet one to which the men and women of Africa were passionately attached, and whose operative value served to bring immense pressure to bear on colonialism, African unity takes off the mask, and crumbles into regionalism inside the hollow shell of nationality itself. The national bourgeoisie, since it is strung up to defend its immediate interests, and sees
no further than the end of its nose, reveals itself incapable of simply bringing national unity into being, or of building up the nation on a stable and productive basis. The national front which has forced colonialism

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to withdraw cracks up, and wastes the victory it has gained.
This merciless fight engaged upon by races and tribes, and this aggressive anxiety to occupy the posts left vacant by the departure of the foreigner, will equally give rise to religious rivalries. In the country districts and the bush, minor confraternities, local religions, and maraboutic cults will show a new vitality and will once more take up their round of excommunications. In the big towns, on the level of the administrative classes, we will observe the coming to grips of the two great revealed religions, Islam and Catholicism.
Colonialism, which had been shaken to its very foundations by the birth of African unity, recovers its balance and tries now to break that will to unity by using all the movement’s weaknesses. Colonialism will set the African peoples moving by revealing to them the existence of “spiritual” rivalries. In Senegal, it is the newspaper New Africa which week by week distills hatred of Islam and of the Arabs. The Lebanese, in whose hands is the greater part of the small trading enterprises on the western seaboard, are marked out for national obloquy. The missionaries find it opportune to remind the masses that long before the advent of European colonialism the great African empires were disrupted by the Arab invasion. There is no hesitation in saying that it was the Arab occupation which paved the way for European colonialism; Arab imperialism is commonly spoken of, and the cultural imperialism of Islam is condemned. Moslems are usually kept out of the more important posts. In other regions the reverse is the case, and it is the native Christians who are considered as conscious, objective enemies of national independence.
Colonialism pulls every string shamelessly, and is only too content to set at loggerheads those Africans who only

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yesterday were leagued against the settlers. The idea of a Saint Bartholomew takes shape in certain minds, and the advocates of colonialism laugh to themselves derisively when they hear magnificent declarations about African unity. Inside a single nation, religion splits up the people into different spiritual communities, all of them kept up and stiffened by colonialism and its instruments. Totally unexpected events break out here and there. In regions where Catholicism or Protestantism predominates, we see the Moslem minorities flinging themselves with unaccustomed ardor into their devotions. The Islamic feast- days are revived, and the Moslem religion defends itself inch by inch against the violent absolutism of the Catholic faith. Ministers of state are heard to say for the benefit of certain individuals that if they are not content they have only to go to Cairo. Sometimes American Protestantism transplants its anti-Catholic prejudices into African soil, and keeps up tribal rivalries through religion.
Taking the continent as a whole, this religious tension may be responsible for the revival of the commonest racial feeling. Africa is divided into Black and White, and the names that are substituted—Africa South of the Sahara, Africa North of the Sahara—do not manage to hide this latent racism. Here, it is affirmed that White Africa has a thousand-year-old tradition of culture; that she is Mediterranean, that she is a continuation of Europe, and that she shares in Greco-Latin civilization. Black Africa is looked on as a region that is inert, brutal, uncivilized, in a word, savage. There, all day long you may hear unpleasant remarks about veiled women, polygamy, and the
supposed disdain the Arabs have for the feminine sex. All such remarks are reminiscent in their aggressiveness of those that are so often heard coming from the settler’s lips. The national bourgeoisie of each of these two great regions, which has totally assimilated colonialist thought

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in its most corrupt form, takes over from the Europeans and establishes in the continent a racial philosophy which is extremely harmful for the future of Africa. By its laziness and will to imitation, it promotes the ingrafting and stiffening of racism which was characteristic of the colonial era. Thus it is by no means astonishing to hear in a country that calls itself African remarks which are neither more nor less than racist, and to observe the existence of paternalist behavior which gives you the bitter impression that you are in Paris, Brussels, or London.
In certain regions of Africa, driveling paternalism with regard to the blacks and the loathsome idea derived from Western culture that the black man is impervious to logic and the sciences reign in all their nakedness. Sometimes it may be ascertained that the black minorities are hemmed in by a kind of semi-slavery which renders legitimate that species of wariness, or in other words mistrust, which the countries of Black Africa feel with regard to the countries of White Africa. It is all too common that a citizen of Black Africa hears himself called a “Negro” by the children when walking in the streets of a big town in White Africa, or finds that civil servants address him in pidgin English.
Yes, unfortunately it is not unknown that students from Black Africa who attend secondary schools north of the Sahara hear their schoolfellows asking if in their country there are houses, if they know what electricity is, or if they practice cannibalism in their families. Yes, unfortunately it is not unknown that in certain regions north of the Sahara Africans coming from countries south of the Sahara meet nationals who implore them to take them “anywhere at all on condition we meet Negroes.” In parallel fashion, in certain young states of Black Africa members of parliament, or even ministers, maintain without a trace of humor that the danger is not at all of a reoccupa-

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tion of their country by colonialism but of an eventual invasion by “those vandals of Arabs coming from the North.”
As we see it, the bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie is not apparent in the economic field only. They have come to power in the name of a narrow nationalism and representing a race; they will prove themselves incapable of triumphantly putting into practice a program with even a minimum humanist content, in spite of fine-sounding declarations which are devoid of meaning since the speakers bandy about in irresponsible fashion phrases that come straight out of European treatises on morals and political philosophy. When the bourgeoisie is strong, when it can arrange everything and everybody to serve its power, it does not hesitate to affirm positively certain democratic ideas which claim to be universally applicable. There must be very exceptional circumstances if such a bourgeoisie, solidly based economically, is forced into denying its own humanist ideology. The Western bourgeoisie, though fundamentally racist, most often manages to mask this racism by a multiplicity of nuances which allow it to preserve intact its proclamation of mankind’s outstanding dignity.
The Western bourgeoisie has prepared enough fences and railings to have no real fear of the competition of those whom it exploits and holds in contempt. Western bourgeois racial prejudice as regards the nigger and the Arab is a racism of contempt; it is a racism which minimizes what it hates. Bourgeois ideology, however, which is the proclamation of an essential equality between men, manages to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the sub-men to become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the Western bourgeoisie.
The racial prejudice of the young national bourgeoisie

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is a racism of defense, based on fear. Essentially it is no different from vulgar tribalism, or the rivalries between septs or confraternities. We may understand why keenwitted international observers have hardly taken seriously the great flights of oratory about African unity, for it is true that there are so many cracks in that unity visible to the naked eye that it is only reasonable to insist that all these contradictions ought to be resolved before the day of unity can come.
The peoples of Africa have only recently come to know themselves. They have decided, in the name of the whole continent, to weigh in strongly against the colonial regime. Now the nationalist bourgeoisies, who in region after region hasten to make their own fortunes and to set up a national system of exploitation, do their utmost to put obstacles in the path of this “Utopia.” The national bourgeoisies, who are quite clear as to what their objectives are, have decided to bar the way to that unity, to that coordinated effort on the part of two hundred and fifty million men to triumph over stupidity, hunger, and inhumanity at one and the same time. This is why we must understand that African unity can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie.
As regards internal affairs and in the sphere of institutions, the national bourgeoisie will give equal proof of its incapacity. In a certain number of underdeveloped countries the parliamentary game is faked from the beginning. Powerless economically, unable to bring about the existence of coherent social relations, and standing on the principle of its domination as a class, the bourgeoisie chooses the solution that seems to it the easiest, that of the single party. It does not yet have the quiet conscience and the calm that economic power and the control of the

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state machine alone can give. It does not create a state that reassures the ordinary citizen, but rather one that rouses his anxiety.
The state, which by its strength and discretion ought to inspire confidence and disarm and lull everybody to sleep, on the contrary seeks to impose itself in spectacular fashion. It makes a display, it jostles people and bullies them, thus intimating to the citizen that he is in continual danger. The single party is the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous, and cynical.
It is true that such a dictatorship does not go very far. It cannot halt the processes of its own contradictions. Since the bourgeoisie has not the economic means to ensure its domination and to throw a few crumbs to the rest of the country; since, moreover, it is preoccupied with filling its pockets as rapidly as possible but also as prosaically as possible, the country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation. And in order to hide this stagnation and to mark this regression, to reassure itself and to give itself something to boast about, the bourgeoisie can find nothing better to do than to erect grandiose buildings in the capital and to lay out money on what are called prestige expenses.
The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interior and on the real facts of its undeveloped country, and tends to look toward the former mother country and the foreign capitalists who count on its obliging compliance. As it does not share its profits with the people, and in no way allows them to enjoy any of the dues that are paid to it by the big foreign companies, it will discover the need for a popular leader to whom will
fall the dual role of stabilizing the regime and of perpetuating the domination of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois dictatorship of underdeveloped countries draws its

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strength from the existence of a leader. We know that in the well-developed countries the bourgeois dictatorship is the result of the economic power of the bourgeoisie. In the underdeveloped countries on the contrary the leader stands for moral power, in whose shelter the thin and poverty-stricken bourgeoisie of the young nation decides to get rich.
The people who for years on end have seen this leader and heard him speak, who from a distance in a kind of dream have followed his contests with the colonial power, spontaneously put their trust in this patriot. Before independence, the leader generally embodies the aspirations of the people for independence, political liberty, and national dignity. But as soon as independence is declared, far from embodying in concrete form the needs of the people in what touches bread, land, and the restoration of the country to the sacred hands of the people, the leader will reveal his inner purpose: to become the general president of that company of profiteers impatient for their returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie.
In spite of his frequently honest conduct and his sincere declarations, the leader as seen objectively is the fierce defender of these interests, today combined, of the national bourgeoisie and the ex-colonial companies. His honesty, which is his soul’s true bent, crumbles away little by little. His contact with the masses is so unreal that he comes to believe that his autliority is hated and that the services that he has rendered his country are being called in question. The leader judges the ingratitude of the masses harshly, and every day that passes ranges himself a little more resolutely on the side of the exploiters. He therefore knowingly becomes the aider and abettor of the young bourgeoisie which is plunging into the mire of corruption and pleasure.
The economic channels of the young state sink back

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inevitably into neocolonialist lines. The national economy, formerly protected, is today literally controlled. The budget is balanced through loans and gifts, while every three or four months the chief ministers themselves or else their governmental delegations come to the erstwhile mother countries or elsewhere, fishing for capital.
The former colonial power increases its demands, accumulates concessions and guarantees and takes fewer and fewer pains to mask the hold it has over the national government. The people stagnate deplorably in unbearable poverty; slowly they awaken to the unutterable treason of their leaders. This awakening is all the more acute in that the bourgeoisie is incapable of learning its lesson. The distribution of wealth that it effects is not spread out between a great many sectors; it is not ranged among different levels, nor does it set up a hierarchy of halftones. The new caste is an affront all the more disgusting in that the immense majority, nine-tenths of the population, continue to die of starvation. The scandalous enrichment, speedy and pitiless, of this caste is accompanied by a decisive awakening on the part of the people, and a growing awareness that promises stormy days to come. The bourgeois caste, that section of the nation which annexes for its own profit all the wealth of the country, by a kind of unexpected logic will pass disparaging judgments upon the other Negroes and the other Arabs that more often than not are reminiscent of the racist doctrines of the former representatives of the colonial power. At one and the same time the poverty of the people, the immoderate money-making of the bourgeois caste, and its widespread scorn for the rest of the nation will harden thought and action.
But such threats will lead to the reaffirmation of authority and the appearance of dictatorship. The leader, who has behind him a lifetime of political action and devoted

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patriotism, constitutes a screen between the people and the rapacious bourgeoisie since he stands surety for the ventures of that caste and closes his eyes to their insolence, their mediocrity, and their fundamental immorality. He acts as a braking-power on the awakening consciousness of the people. He comes to the aid of the bourgeois caste and hides his maneuvers from the people, thus becoming the most eager worker in the task of mystifying and bewildering the masses. Every time he speaks to the people he calls to mind his often heroic life, the struggles he has led in the name of the people and the victories that in their name he has achieved, thereby intimating clearly to the masses that they ought to go on putting their confidence in him. There are plenty of examples of African patriots who have introduced into the cautious political advance of their elders a decisive style characterized by its nationalist outlook. These men came from the backwoods, and they proclaimed, to the scandal of the dominating power and the shame of the nationals of the capital, that they came from the backwoods and that they spoke in the name of the Negroes. These men, who have sung the praises of their race, who have taken upon themselves the whole burden of the past, complete with cannibalism and degeneracy, find themselves today, alas, at the head of a team of administrators which turns its back on the jungle and which proclaims that the vocation of the people is to obey, to go on obeying, and to be obedient till the end of time.
The leader pacifies the people. For years on end after independence has been won, we see him, incapable of urging on the people to a concrete task, unable really to open the future to them or of flinging them into the path of national reconstruction, that is to say, of their own reconstruction; we see him reassessing the history of independence and recalling the sacred unity of the strug-

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gle for liberation. The leader, because he refuses to break up the national bourgeoisie, asks the people to fall back into the past and to become drunk on the remembrance of the epoch which led up to independence. The leader, seen objectively, brings the people to a halt and persists in either expelling them from history or preventing them from taking root in it. During the struggle for liberation the leader awakened the people and promised them a forward march, heroic and unmitigated. Today, he uses every means to put them to sleep, and three or four times a year asks them to remember the colonial period and to look back on the long way they have come since then.
Now it must be said that the masses show themselves totally incapable of appreciating the long way they have come. The peasant who goes on scratching out a living from the soil, and the unemployed man who never finds employment do not manage, in spite of public holidays and flags, new and brightly colored though they may be, to convince themselves that anything has really changed in their lives. The bourgeoisie who are in power vainly increase the number of processions; the masses have no illusions. They are hungry; and the police officers, though they are now Africans, do not serve to reassure them particularly. The masses begin to sulk; they turn away from this nation in which they have been given no place and begin to lose interest in it.
From time to time, however, the leader makes an effort; he speaks on the radio or makes a tour of the country to pacify the people, to calm them and bemuse them. The leader is all the more necessary in that there is no party. During the period of the struggle for independence there was one right enough, a party led by the present leader. But since then this party has sadly disintegrated; nothing is left but the shell of a party, the name, the emblem, and

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the motto. The living party, which ought to make possible the free exchange of ideas which have been elaborated according to the real needs of the mass of the people, has been transformed into a trade union of individual interests. Since the proclamation of independence the party no longer helps the people to set out its demands, to become more aware of its needs and better able to establish its power. Today, the party’s mission is to deliver to the people the instructions which issue from the summit. There no longer exists the fruitful give-and- take from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom which creates and guarantees democracy in a party. Quite on the contrary, the party has made itself into a screen between the masses and the leaders. There is no longer any party life, for the branches which were set up during the colonial period are today completely demobilized.
The militant champs on his bit. Now it is that the attitude taken up by certain militants during the struggle for liberation is seen to be justified, for the fact is that in the thick of the fight more than a few militants asked the leaders to formulate a dogma, to set out their objectives, and to draw up a program. But under the pretext of safeguarding national unity, the leaders categorically refused to attempt such a task. The only worthwhile dogma, it was repeatedly stated, is the union of the nation against colonialism. And on they went, armed with an impetuous slogan which stood for principles, while their only ideological activity took the form of a series of variants on the theme of the right of peoples to self- determination, borne on the wind of history which would inevitably sweep away colonialism. When the militants asked whether the wind of history couldn’t be a little more clearly analyzed, the leaders gave them instead hope and trust, the necessity of decolonialization and its in-

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evitability, and more to that effect.
After independence, the party sinks into an extraordinary lethargy. The militants are only called upon when so-called popular manifestations are afoot, or international conferences, or independence celebrations. The local party leaders are given administrative posts, the party becomes an administration, and the militants disappear into the crowd and take the empty title of citizen. Now that they have fulfilled their historical mission of leading the bourgeoisie to power, they are firmly invited to retire so that the bourgeoisie may carry out its mission in peace and quiet. But we have seen that the national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is incapable of carrying out any mission whatever. After a few years, the break-up of the party becomes obvious, and any observer, even the most superficial, can notice that the party, today the skeleton of its former self, only serves to immobilize the people. The party, which during the battle had drawn to itself the whole nation, is falling to pieces. The intellectuals who on the eve of independence rallied to the party, now make it clear by their attitude that they gave their support with no other end in view than to secure their slices of the cake of independence. The party is becoming a means of private advancement.
There exists inside the new regime, however, an inequality in the acquisition of wealth and in monopolization. Some have a double source of income and demonstrate that they are specialized in opportunism. Privileges multiply and corruption triumphs, while morality declines. Today the vultures are too numerous and too voracious in proportion to the lean spoils of the national wealth. The party, a true instrument of power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, reinforces the machine, and ensures that the people are hemmed in and immobilized. The party helps the government to hold the people down. It be-

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comes more and more clearly anti-democratic, an implement of coercion. The party is objectively, sometimes subjectively, the accomplice of the merchant bourgeoisie. In the same way that the national bourgeoisie conjures away its phase of construction in order to throw itself into the enjoyment of its wealth, in parallel fashion in the institutional sphere it jumps the parliamentary phase and chooses a dictatorship of the national-socialist type. We know today that this fascism at high interest which has triumphed for half a century in Latin America is the dialectic result of states which were semi-colonial during the period of independence.
In these poor, underdeveloped countries, where the rule is that the greatest wealth is surrounded by the greatest poverty, the army and the police constitute the pillars of the regime; an army and a police force (another rule which must not be forgotten) which are advised by foreign experts. The strength of the police force and the power of the army are proportionate to the stagnation in which the rest of the nation is sunk. By dint of yearly loans, concessions are snatched up by foreigners; scandals are numerous, ministers grow rich, their wives doll themselves up, the members of parliament feather their nests and there is not a soul down to the simple policeman or the customs officer who does not join in the great procession of corruption.
The opposition becomes more aggressive and the people at once catch on to its propaganda. From now on their hostility to the bourgeoisie is plainly visible. This young bourgeoisie which appears to be afflicted with precocious senility takes no heed of the advice showered upon it, and reveals itself incapable of understanding that it would be in its interest to draw a veil, even if only the flimsiest kind, over its exploitation. It is the most Christian newspaper,

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The African Weekly, published in Brazzaville, which addresses the princes of the regime thus:

« You who are in good positions, you and your wives, today you enjoy many comforts; perhaps a good education, a fine house, good contacts, and many missions on which you are delegated which open new horizons to you. But all your wealth forms a hard shell which prevents your seeing the poverty that surrounds you. Take care. »

This warning coming from The African Weekly and addressed to the henchmen of Monsieur Youlou has, we may imagine, nothing revolutionary about it. What The African Weekly wants to point out to the starvers of the Congolese people is that God will punish their conduct. It continues:

« If there is no room in your heart for consideration toward those who are beneath you, there will be no room for you in God’s house. »

It is clear that the national bourgeoisie hardly worries at all about such an indictment. With its wave lengths tuned in to Europe, it continues firmly and resolutely to make the most of the situation. The enormous profits which it derives from the exploitation of the people are exported to foreign countries. The young national bourgeoisie is often more suspicious of the regime that it has set up than are the foreign companies. The national bourgeoisie refuses to invest in its own country and behaves toward the state that protects and nurtures it with, it must be remarked, astonishing ingratitude. It acquires foreign securities in the European markets, and goes off to spend the weekend in Paris or Hamburg. The behavior of the national bourgeoisie of certain underdeveloped countries is reminiscent of the members of a gang, who after every holdup hide their share in the loot from the other members who are their accomplices and prudently

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start thinking about their retirement. Such behavior shows that more or less consciously the national bourgeoisie is playing to lose if the game goes on too long. They guess that the present situation will not last indefinitely but they intend to make the most of it. Such exploitation and such contempt for the state, however, inevitably gives rise to discontent among the mass of the people. It is in these conditions that the regime becomes harsher. In the absence of a parliament it is the army that becomes the arbiter: but sooner or later it will realize its power and will hold over the government’s head the threat of a manifesto.
As we see it, the national bourgeoisie of certain underdeveloped countries has learned nothing from books. If they had looked closer at the Latin American countries they doubtless would have recognized the dangers which threaten them. We may thus conclude that this bourgeoisie in miniature that thrusts itself into the forefront is condemned to mark time, accomplishing nothing. In underdeveloped countries the bourgeois phase is impossibly arid. Certainly, there is a police dictatorship and a profiteering caste, but the construction of an elaborate bourgeois society seems to be condemned to failure. The ranks of decked-out profiteers whose grasping hands scrape
up the bank notes from a poverty-stricken country will sooner or later be men of straw in the hands of the army, cleverly handled by foreign experts. In this way the former mother country practices indirect government, both by the bourgeoisie that it upholds and also by the national army led by its experts, an army that pins the people down, immobilizing and terrorizing them.
The observations that we have been able to make about the national bourgeoisie bring us to a conclusion which should cause no surprise. In underdeveloped countries, the bourgeoisie should not be allowed to find the conditions

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necessary for its existence and its growth. In other words, the combined effort of the masses led by a party and of intellectuals who are highly conscious and armed with revolutionary principles ought to bar the way to this useless and harmful middle class.
The theoretical question that for the last fifty years has been raised whenever the history of underdeveloped countries is under discussion—whether or not the bourgeois phase can be skipped—ought to be answered in the field of revolutionary action, and not by logic. The bourgeois phase in underdeveloped countries can only justify itself in so far as the national bourgeoisie has sufficient economic and technical strength to build up a bourgeois society, to create the conditions necessary for the development of a large-scale proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and finally to make possible the existence of an authentic national culture.
A bourgeoisie similar to that which developed in Europe is able to elaborate an ideology and at the same time strengthen its own power. Such a bourgeoisie, dynamic, educated, and secular has fully succeeded in its undertaking of the accumulation of capital and has given to the nation a minimum of prosperity. In underdeveloped countries, we have seen that no true bourgeoisie exists; there is only a sort of little greedy caste, avid and voracious,
with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it. This get-rich-quick middle class shows itself incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness. It remembers what it has read in European textbooks and imperceptibly it becomes not even the replica of Europe, but its caricature.
The struggle against the bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is far from being a theoretical one. It is not concerned with making out its condemnation as laid down by the judgment of history. The national bourgeoisie of

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underdeveloped countries must not be opposed because it threatens to slow down the total, harmonious development of the nation. It must simply be stoutly opposed because, literally, it is good for nothing. This bourgeoisie, expressing its mediocrity in its profits, its achievements, and in its thought tries to hide this mediocrity by buildings which have prestige value at the individual level, by chromium-plating on big American cars, by holidays on the Riviera and weekends in neon-lit nightclubs.
This bourgeoisie which turns its back more and more on the people as a whole does not even succeed in extracting spectacular concessions from the West, such as investments which would be of value for the country’s economy or the setting up of certain industries. On the contrary, assembly plants spring up and consecrate the type of neo-colonialist industrialization in which the country’s economy flounders. Thus it must not be said that the national bourgeoisie retards the country’s evo­lution, that it makes it lose time or that it threatens to lead the nation up blind alleys. In fact, the bourgeois phase in the history of underdeveloped countries is a completely useless phase. When this caste has vanished, devoured by its own contradictions, it will be seen that nothing new has happened since independence was proclaimed, and that everything must be started again from scratch. The changeover will not take place at the level of the structures set up by the bourgeoisie during its reign, since that caste has done nothing more than take over unchanged the legacy of the economy, the thought, and the institutions left by the colonialists.
It is all the easier to neutralize this bourgeois class in that, as we have seen, it is numerically, intellectually, and economically weak. In the colonized territories, the bourgeois caste draws its strength after independence chiefly from agreements reached with the former colonial power.

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The national bourgeoisie has all the more opportunity to take over from the oppressor since it has been given time for a leisurely tete-a-tete with the ex-colonial power. But deep-rooted contradictions undermine the ranks of that bourgeoisie; it is this that gives the observer an impression of instability. There is not as yet a homogeneity of caste. Many intellectuals, for example, condemn this regime based on the domination of the few. In underdeveloped countries, there are certain members of the elite, intellectuals and civil servants, who are sincere, who feel the necessity for a planned economy, the outlawing of profiteers, and the strict prohibition of attempts at mystification. In addition, such men fight in a certain measure for the mass participation of the people in the ordering of public affairs.
In those underdeveloped countries which accede to independence, there almost always exists a small number of honest intellectuals, who have no very precise ideas about politics, but who instinctively distrust the race for positions and pensions which is symptomatic of the early days of independence in colonized countries. The personal situation of these men (breadwinners of large families) or their background (hard struggles and a strictly moral upbringing) explains their manifest contempt for profiteers and schemers. We must know how to use these men in the decisive battle that we mean to engage upon which
will lead to a healthier outlook for the nation. Closing the road to the national bourgeoisie is, certainly, the means whereby the vicissitudes of newfound independence may be avoided, and with them the decline of morals, the installing of corruption within the country, economic regression, and the immediate disaster of an anti-democratic regime depending on force and intimidation. But it is also the only means toward progress.
What holds up the taking of a decision by the pro-

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foundly democratic elements of the young nation and adds to their timidity is the apparent strength of the bourgeoisie. In newly independent underdeveloped countries, the whole of the ruling class swarms into the towns built by colonialism. The absence of any analysis of the total population induces onlookers to think that there exists a powerful and perfectly organized bourgeoisie. In fact, we know today that the bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries is non-existent. What creates a bourgeoisie is not the bourgeois spirit, nor its taste or manners, nor even its aspirations. The bourgeoisie is above all the direct product of precise economic conditions.
Now, in the colonies, the economic conditions are conditions of a foreign bourgeoisie. Through its agents, it is the bourgeoisie of the mother country that we find present in the colonial towns. The bourgeoisie in the colonies is, before independence, a Western bourgeoisie, a true branch of the bourgeoisie of the mother country, that derives its legitimacy, its force, and its stability from the bourgeoisie of the homeland. During the period of unrest that precedes independence, certain native elements, intellectuals, and traders, who live in the midst of that imported bourgeoisie, try to identify themselves with it. A permanent wish for identification with the bourgeois representatives of the mother country is to be found among the native intellectuals and merchants.
This native bourgeoisie, which has adopted unreservedly and with enthusiasm the ways of thinking characteristic of the mother country, which has become wonderfully detached from its own thought and has based its consciousness upon foundations which are typically foreign, will realize, with its mouth watering, that it lacks something essential to a bourgeoisie: money. The bourgeoisie of an underdeveloped country is a bourgeoisie in spirit only. It is not its economic strength, nor the dy-

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namism of its leaders, nor the breadth of its ideas that ensures its peculiar quality as bourgeoisie. Consequently it remains at the beginning and for a long time afterward a bourgeoisie of the civil service. It is the positions that it holds in the new national administration which will give it strength and serenity. If the government gives it enough time and opportunity, this bourgeoisie will manage to put away enough money to stiffen its domination. But it will always reveal itself as incapable of giving birth to an authentic bourgeois society with all the economic and industrial consequences which this entails.
From the beginning the national bourgeoisie directs its efforts toward activities of the intermediary type. The basis of its strength is found in its aptitude for trade and small business enterprises, and in securing commissions. It is not its money that works, but its business acumen. It does not go in for investments and it cannot achieve that accumulation of capital necessary to the birth and blossoming of an authentic bourgeoisie. At that rate it would take centuries to set on foot an embryonic industrial revolution, and in any case it would find the way barred by the relentless opposition of the former mother country, which will have taken all precautions when setting up neo-colonialist trade conventions.
If the government wants to bring the country out of its stagnation and set it well on the road toward development and progress, it must first and foremost nationalize the middleman’s trading sector. The bourgeoisie, who wish to see both the triumph of the spirit of money-making and the enjoyment of consumer goods, and at the same time the triumph of their contemptuous attitude toward the mass of the people and the scandalous aspect of profit- making (should not we rather call it robbery?), in fact invest largely in this sector. The intermediary market which formerly was dominated by the settlers will be invaded by

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the young national bourgeoisie. In a colonial economy the intermediary sector is by far the most important. If you want to progresSj you must decide in the first few hours to nationalize this sector. But it is clear that such a nationalization ought not to take on a rigidly state-controlled aspect. It is not a question of placing at the head of these services citizens who have had no political education. Every time such a procedure has been adopted it has been seen that the government has in fact contributed to the triumph of a dictatorship of civil servants who had been set in the mold of the former mother country, and who quickly showed themselves incapable of thinking in terms of the nation as a whole. These civil servants very soon began to sabotage the national economy and to throw its structure out of joint; under them, corruption, prevarication, the diversion of stocks, and the black market came to stay. Nationalizing the intermediary sector means organizing wholesale and retail cooperatives on a democratic basis; it also means decentralizing these cooperatives by getting the mass of the people interested in the ordering of public affairs. You will not be able to do all this unless you give the people some political education. Previously, it was realized that this key problem should be clarified once and for all. Today, it is true that the principle of the political education of the masses is generally subscribed to in underdeveloped countries. But it does not seem that this primordial task is really taken to heart. When people stress the need to educate the people politically, they decide to point out at the same time that they want to be supported by the people in the action that they are taking. A government which declares that it wishes to educate the people politically thus expresses its desire to govern with the people and for the people. It ought not to speak a language destined to camouflage a bourgeois administration. In the capitalist countries, the bourgeois

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governments have long since left this infantile stage of authority behind. To put it bluntly, they govern with the help of their laws, their economic strength, and their police. Now that their power is firmly established they no longer need to lose time in striking demagogic attitudes. They govern in their own interests, and they have the courage of their own strength. They have created legitimacy, and they are strong in their own right.
The bourgeois caste in newly independent countries has not yet the cynicism nor the unruffled calm which is founded on the strength of long-established bourgeoisies. From this springs the fact that it shows a certain anxiety to hide its real convictions, to sidetrack, and in short to set itself up as a popular force. But the inclusion of the masses in politics does not consist in mobilizing three or four times a year ten thousand or a hundred thousand men and women. These mass meetings and spectacular gatherings are akin to the old tactics that date from before independence, whereby you exhibited your forces in order to prove to yourself and to others that you had the people behind you. The political education of the masses proposes not to treat the masses as children but to make adults of them.
This brings us to consider the role of the political party in an underdeveloped country. We have seen in the preceding pages that very often simple souls, who moreover belong to the newly born bourgeoisie, never stop repeating that in an underdeveloped country the direction of affairs by a strong authority, in other words a dictatorship, is a necessity. With this in view the party is given the task of supervising the masses. The party plays understudy to the administration and the police, and controls the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from

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them obedience and discipline. That famous dictatorship, whose supporters believe that it is called for by the historical process and consider it an indispensable prelude to the dawn of independence, in fact symbolizes the decision of the bourgeois caste to govern the underdeveloped country first with the help of the people, but soon against them. The progressive transformation of the party into an information service is the indication that the government holds itself more and more on the defensive. The incoherent mass of the people is seen as a blind force that must be continually held in check either by mystification or by the fear inspired by the police force. The party acts as a barometer and as an information service. The militant is turned into an informer. He is entrusted with punitive expeditions against the villages. The embryo opposition parties are liquidated by beatings and stonings. The opposition candidates see their houses set on fire. The police increase their provocations. In these conditions, you may be sure, the party is unchallenged and 99.99% of the votes are cast for the government candidate. We should add that in Africa a certain number of governments actually behave in this way. All the opposition parties, which moreover are usually progressive and would therefore tend to work for the greater influence of the masses in the conduct of public matters, and who desire that the proud, money-making bourgeoisie should be brought to heel, have been by dint of baton charges and prisons condemned first to silence and then to a clandestine existence.
The political party in many parts of Africa which are today independent is puffed up in a most dangerous way. In the presence of a member of the party, the people are silent, behave like a flock of sheep, and publish panegyrics in praise of the government or the leader. But in the street when evening comes, away from the village, in the cafés or by the river, the bitter disappointment of the people,

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their despair but also their unceasing anger makes itself heard. The party, instead of welcoming the expression of popular discontent, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen, and forbids such ideas. The party leaders behave like common sergeant-majors, frequently reminding the people of the need for “silence in the ranks.” This party which used to call itself the servant of the people, which used to claim that it worked for the full expression of the people’s will, as soon as the colonial power puts the country into its control hastens to send the people back to their caves. As far as national unity is concerned the party will also make many mistakes, as for example when the so-called national party behaves as a party based on ethnic differences. It becomes, in fact, the tribe which makes itself into a party. This party which of its own will proclaims that it is a national party, and which claims to speak in the name of the totality of the people, secretly, sometimes even openly, organizes an authentic ethnic dictatorship. We no longer see the rise of a bourgeois dictatorship, but a tribal dictatorship. The ministers, the members of the cabinet, the ambassadors and local commissioners are chosen from the same ethnological group as the leader, sometimes directly from his own family. Such regimes of the family sort seem to go back to the old laws of inbreeding, and not anger but shame is felt when we are faced with such stupidity, such an imposture, such intellectual and spiritual poverty. These heads of the government are the true traitors in Africa, for they sell their country to the most terrifying of all its enemies: stupidity. This tribalizing of the central authority, it is certain, encourages regionalist ideas and separatism. All the decentralizing tendencies spring up again and triumph, and the nation falls to pieces, broken in bits. The leader, who once used to call for “African unity” and

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who thought of his own little family, wakes up one day to find himself saddled with five tribes, who also want to have their own ambassadors and ministers; and irresponsible as ever, still unaware and still despicable, he denounces their “treason.”
We have more than once drawn attention to the baleful influence frequently wielded by the leader. This is due to the fact that the party in certain districts is organized like a gang, with the toughest person in it as its head. The ascendency of such a leader and his power over others is often mentioned, and people have no hesitation in declaring, in a tone of slightly admiring complicity, that he strikes terror into his nearest collaborators. In order to avoid these many pitfalls an unceasing battle must be waged, a battle to prevent the party from ever becoming a willing tool in the hands of a leader. “Leader”: the word comes from the English verb “to lead,” but a frequent French translation is “to drive.” The driver, the shepherd of the people, no longer exists today. The people are no longer a herd; they do not need to be driven. If the leader drives me on, I want him to realize that at the same time I show him the way; the nation ought not to be something bossed by a Grand Panjandrum. We may understand the panic caused in government circles each time one of these leaders falls ill; they are obsessed by the question of who is to succeed him. What will happen to the country if the leader disappears? The ruling classes who have abdicated in favor of the leader, irresponsible, oblivious of everything and essentially preoccupied with the pleasures of their everyday life, their cocktail parties, their journeys paid for by government money, the profits they can make out of various schemes—from time to time these people discover the spiritual wasteland at the heart of the nation.
A country that really wishes to answer the questions that history puts to it, that wants to develop not only its

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owns but also the brains of its inhabitants, such a country must possess a trustworthy political party. The party is not a tool in the hands of the government. Quite on the contrary, the party is a tool in the hands of the people; it is they who decide on the policy that the government carries out. The party is not, and ought never to be, the only political bureau where all the members of the government and the chief dignitaries of the regime may meet freely together. Only too frequently the political bureau, unfortunately, consists of all the party and its members who reside permanently in the capital. In an underdeveloped country, the leading members of the party ought to avoid the capital as if it had the plague. They ought, with some few exceptions, to live in the country districts. The centralization of all activity in the city ought to be avoided. No excuse of administrative discipline should be taken as legitimizing that excrescence of a capital which is already overpopulated and overdeveloped with regard to nine- tenths of the country. The party should be decentralized in the extreme. It is the only way to bring life to regions which are dead, those regions which are not yet awakened to life.
In practice, there will be at least one member of the political bureau in each area and he will deliberately not be appointed as head of that area. He will have no administrative powers. The regional member of the political bureau is not expected to hold the highest rank in the regional administrative organization. He ought not automatically to belong to the regional administrative body. For the people, the party is not an authority, but an organism through which they as the people exercise their authority and express their will. The less there is of confusion and duality of powers, the more the party will play its part of guide and the more surely it will constitute for the people a decisive guarantee. If the party is mingled

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with the government, the fact of being a party militant means that you take the short cut to gain private ends, to hold a post in the government, step up the ladder, get promotion and make a career for yourself.
In an underdeveloped country, the setting up of dynamic district officials stops the process whereby the towns become top-heavy and the incoherent rush toward the cities of the mass of country people. The setting up early in the days of independence of regional organizations and officials who have full authority to do everything in their power to awaken such a region, to bring life to it, and to hasten the growth of consciousness in it is a necessity from which there is no escape for a country that wishes to progress. Otherwise, the government big-wigs and the party officials group themselves around the leader. The government services swell to huge proportions, not because they are developing and specializing, but because new-found cousins and fresh militants are looking for jobs and hope to edge themselves into the government machine. And the dream of every citizen is to get up to the capital, and to have his share of the cake. The local districts are deserted; the mass of the country people with no one to lead them, uneducated and unsupported, turn their backs on their poorly labored fields and flock toward the outer ring of suburbs, thus swelling out of all proportion the ranks of the lumpenproletariat.
The moment for a fresh national crisis is not far off. To avoid it, we think that a quite different policy should be followed: that the interior, the back country, ought to be the most privileged part of the country. Moreover, in the last resort, there is nothing inconvenient in the government choosing its seat elsewhere than in the capital. The capital must be deconsecrated; the outcast masses must be shown that we have decided to work for them. It is with this idea in mind that the government of Brazil tried to

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found Brazilia. The dead city of Rio de Janeiro was an insult to the Brazilian people. But, unfortunately, Brazilia is just another new capital, as monstrous as the first. The only advantage of this achievement is that, today, there exists a road through the bush to it.
No, there is no serious reason which can be opposed to the choice of another capital, or to the moving of the government as a whole toward one of the most underpopulated regions. The capital of underdeveloped countries is a commercial notion inherited from the colonial period. But we who are citizens of the underdeveloped countries, we ought to seek every occasion for contacts with the rural masses. We must create a national policy, in other words a policy for the masses. We ought never to lose contact with the people which has battled for its independence and for the concrete betterment of its existence.
The native civil servants and technicians ought not to bury themselves in diagrams and statistics, but rather in the hearts of the people. They ought not to bristle up every time there is question of a move to be made to the “interior.” We should no longer see the young women of the country threaten their husbands with divorce if they do not manage to avoid being appointed to a rural post. For these reasons, the political bureau of the party ought to treat these forgotten districts in a very privileged manner; and the life of the capital, an altogether artificial life which is stuck onto the real, national life like a foreign body, ought to take up the least space possible in the life of the nation, which is sacred and fundamental. In an underdeveloped country, the party ought to be organized in such fashion that it is not simply content with having contacts with the masses. The party should be the direct expression of the masses. The party is not an administration responsible for transmitting government orders; it is

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the energetic spokesman and the incorruptible defender of the masses. In order to arrive at this conception of the party, we must above all rid ourselves of the very Western, very bourgeois and therefore contemptuous attitude that the masses are incapable of governing themselves. In fact, experience proves that the masses understand perfectly the most complicated problems. One of the greatest services that the Algerian revolution will have rendered to the intellectuals of Algeria will be to have placed them in contact with the people, to have allowed them to see the extreme, ineffable poverty of the people, at the same time allowing them to watch the awakening of the people’s intelligence and the onward progress of their consciousness. The Algerian people, that mass of starving illiterates, those men and women plunged for centuries in the most appalling obscurity have held out against tanks and airplanes, against napalm and “psychological services,” but above all against corruption and brainwashing, against traitors and against the “national” armies of General Bellounis. This people has held out in spite of hesitant or feeble individuals, and in spite of would-be dictators. This people has held out because for seven years its struggle has opened up for it vistas that it never dreamed existed. Today, arms factories are working in the midst of the mountains several yards underground; today, the people’s tribunals are functioning at every level, and local planning commissions are organizing the division of large-scale holdings, and working out the Algeria of tomorrow. An isolated individual may obstinately refuse to understand a problem, but the group or the village understands with disconcerting rapidity. It is true that if care is taken to use only a language that is understood by graduates in law and economics, you can easily prove that the masses have to be managed from above. But if you speak the language of everyday, if you are not obsessed by the perverse desire

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to spread confusion and to rid yourself of the people, then you will realize that the masses are quick to seize every shade of meaning and to learn all the tricks of the trade. If recourse is had to technical language, this signifies that it has been decided to consider the masses as uninitiated. Such a language is hard put to it to hide the lecturers’ wish to cheat the people and to leave them out of things. The business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands out the much greater business of plunder. The people’s property and the people’s sovereignty are to be stripped from them at one and the same time. Everything can be explained to the people, on the single condition that you really want them to understand. And if you think that you don’t need them, and that on the contrary they may hinder the smooth running of the many limited liability companies whose aim it is to make the people even poorer, then the problem is quite clear.
For if you think that you can manage a country without letting the people interfere, if you think that the people upset the game by their mere presence, whether they slow it down or whether by their natural ignorance they sabotage it, then you must have no hesitation: you must keep the people out. Now, it so happens that when the people are invited to partake in the management of the country, they do not slow the movement down but on the contrary they speed it up. We Algerians have had the occasion and the good fortune during the course of this war to handle a fair number of questions. In certain country districts, the politico-military leaders of the revolution found themselves in fact confronted with situations which called for radical solutions. We shall look at some of these situations.
During the years 1956-57, French colonialism had marked off certain zones as forbidden, and within these zones people’s movements were strictly controlled. Thus

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the peasants could no longer go freely to the towns and buy provisions. During this period, the grocers made huge profits. The prices of tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, and salt soared. The black market flourished blatantly. The peasants who could not pay in money mortgaged their crops, in other words their land, or else lopped off field after field of their fathers’ farms and during the second phase worked them for the grocer. As soon as the political commissioners realized the danger of the situation they reacted immediately. Thus a rational system of provisioning was instituted: the grocer who went to the town was obliged to buy from nationalist wholesalers who handed him an invoice which clearly showed the prices of the goods. When the retailer got back to the village, before doing anything else he had to go to the political commissioner who checked the invoice, decided on the margin of profit and fixed the price at which the various goods should be sold. However, the retailer soon discovered a new trick, and after three or four days declared that his stocks had run out. In fact, he went on with his business of selling on the black market on the sly. The reaction of the politico- military authorities was thoroughgoing. Heavy penalizations were decided on, and the fines collected were put into the village funds and used for social purposes or to pay for public works in the general interest. Sometimes it was decided to shut down the shop for a while. Then if there was a repetition of black marketeering, the business was at once confiscated and a managing committee elected to carry it on, which paid a monthly allowance to the former owner.
Taking these experiences as a starting point, the functioning of the main laws of economics was explained to the people, with concrete examples. The accumulation of capital ceased to be a theory and became a very real and immediate mode of behavior. The people understood how

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that once a man was in trade, he could become rich and increase his turnover. Then and then only did the peasants tell the tale of how the grocer gave them loans at exorbitant interest, and others recalled how he evicted them from their land and how from owners they became laborers. The more the people understand, the more watchful they become, and the more they come to realize that finally everything depends on them and their salvation lies in their own cohesion, in the true understanding of their interests, and in knowing who their enemies are. The people come to understand that wealth is not the fruit of labor but the result of organized, protected robbery. Rich people are no longer respectable people; they are nothing more than flesh-eating animals, jackals, and vultures which wallow in the people’s blood. With another end in view the political commissioners have had to decide that nobody will work for anyone else any longer. The land belongs to those that till it. This is a principle which has through explanation become a fundamental law of the Algerian revolution. The peasants who used to employ agricultural laborers have been obliged to give a share of the land to their former employees.
So it may been seen that production per acre trebled, in spite of the many raids by the French, in spite of bombardments from the air, and the difficulty of getting manures. The fellahs who at harvest time were able to judge and weigh the crops thus obtained wanted to know whence came such a phenomenon; and they were quick to understand that the idea of work is not as simple as all that, that slavery is opposed to work, and that work presupposes liberty, responsibility, and consciousness.
In those districts where we have been able to carry out successfully these interesting experiments, where we have watched man being created by revolutionary beginnings, the peasants have very clearly caught hold of the idea that

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the more intelligence you bring to your work, the more pleasure you will have in it. We have been able to make the masses understand that work is not simply the output of energy, nor the functioning of certain muscles, but that people work more by using their brains and their hearts than with only their muscles and their sweat. In the same way in these liberated districts which are at the same time excluded from the old trade routes we have had to modify production, which formerly looked only toward the towns and toward export. We have organized production to meet consumers’ needs for the people and for the units of the national army of liberation. We have quadrupled the production of lentils and organized the manufacture of charcoal. Green vegetables and charcoal have been sent through the mountains from the north to the south, whereas the southern districts send meat to the north. This coordination was decided upon by the FLN and it was they who set up the system of communications. We did not have any technicians or planners coming from big Western universities; but in these liberated regions, the daily ration went up to the hitherto unheard-of figure of 3,200 calories. The people were not content with coming triumphant out of this test. They started asking themselves theoretical questions: for example, why did certain districts never see an orange before the war of liberation, while thousands of tons are exported every year abroad? Why were grapes unknown to a great many Algerians whereas the European peoples enjoyed them by the million? Today, the people have a very clear notion of what belongs to them. The Algerian people today know that they are the sole owners of the soil and mineral wealth of their country. And if some individuals do not understand the unrelenting refusal of the FLN to tolerate any encroachment on this right of ownership, and its fierce refusal to allow any compromise on principles, they must 

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one and all remember that the Algerian people is today an adult people, responsible and fully conscious of its responsibilities. In short, the Algerians are men of property.
If we have taken the example of Algeria to illustrate our subject, it is not at all with the intention of glorifying our own people, but simply to show the important part played by the war in leading them toward consciousness of themselves. It is clear that other peoples have come to the same conclusion in different ways.We know for sure today that in Algeria the test of force was inevitable; but other countries through political action and through the work of clarification undertaken by a party have led their people to the same results. In Algeria, we have realized that the masses are equal to the problems which confront them. In an underdeveloped country, experience proves that the important thing is not that three hundred people form a plan and decide upon carrying it out, but that the whole people plan and decide even if it takes them twice or three times as long. The fact is that the time taken up by explaining, the time ‘lost” in treating the worker as a human being, will be caught up in the execution of the plan. People must know where they are going, and why. The politician should not ignore the fact that the future remains a closed book so long as the consciousness of the people remains imperfect, elementary, and cloudy. We African politicians must have very clear ideas on the situation of our people. But this clarity of ideas must be profoundly dialectical. The awakening of the whole people will not come about all at once; the people’s work in the building of the nation will not immediately take on its full dimensions: first because the means of communication
and transmission are only beginning to be developed; secondly because the yardstick of time must no longer be that of the moment or up till the next harvest, but must

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become that of the rest of the world, and lastly because the spirit of discouragement which has been deeply rooted in people’s minds by colonial domination is still very near the surface. But we must not overlook the fact that victory over those weaknesses which are the heritage of the material and spiritual domination of the country by another is a necessity from which no government will be able to escape. Let us take the example of work under the colonial regime. The settler never stopped complaining that the native is slow. Today, in certain countries which have become independent, we hear the ruling classes taking up the same cry. The fact is that the settler wanted the native to be enthusiastic. By a sort of process of mystification which constitutes the most sublime type of separation from reality, he wanted to persuade the slave that the land that he worked belonged to him, that the mines where he lost his health were owned by him. The settler was singularly forgetful of the fact that he was growing rich through the death throes of the slave. In fact what the settler was saying to the native was “Kill yourself that I may become rich.” Today, we must behave in a different fashion. We ought not to say to the people: “Kill yourselves that the country may become rich.” If we want to increase the national revenue, and decrease the importing of certain products which are useless, or even harmful, if we want to increase agricultural production and overcome illiteracy, we must explain what we are about. The people must understand what is at stake. Public business ought to be the business of the public. So the necessity of creating a large number of well-informed nuclei at the bottom crops up again. Too often, in fact, we are content to establish national organizations at the top and always in the capital: the Women’s Union, the Young People’s Federation, Trade Unions, etc. But if one takes the trouble to investigate what is behind the office in the capital, if you go into

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the inner room where the reports ought to be, you will be shocked by the emptiness, the blank spaces, and the bluff. There must be a basis; there must be cells that supply content and life. The masses should be able to meet together, discuss, propose, and receive directions. The citizens should be able to speak, to express themselves, and to put forward new ideas. The branch meeting and the committee meeting are liturgical acts. They are privileged occasions given to a human being to listen and to speak. At each meeting, the brain increases its means of participation and the eye discovers a landscape more and more in keeping with human dignity.
The large proportion of young people in the underdeveloped countries raises specific problems for the government, which must be tackled with lucidity. The young people of the towns, idle and often illiterate, are a prey to all sorts of disintegrating influences. It is to the youth of an underdeveloped country that the industrialized countries most often offer their pastimes. Normally, there is a certain homogeneity between the mental and material level of the members of any given society and the pleasures which that society creates for itself. But in underdeveloped countries, young people have at their disposition leisure occupations designed for the youth of capitalist countries: detective novels, penny-in-the-slot machines, sexy photographs, pornographic literature, films banned to those under sixteen, and above all alcohol. In the West, the family circle, the effects of education, and the relatively high standard of living of the working classes provide a more or less efficient protection against the harmful action of these pastimes. But in an African country, where mental development is uneven, where the violent collision of two worlds has considerably shaken old traditions and thrown the universe of the perceptions out of focus, the impressionability and sensibility of the young African are at the

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mercy of the various assaults made upon them by the very nature of Western culture. His family very often proves itself incapable of showing stability and homogeneity when faced with such attacks.
In this domain, the government’s duty is to act as a filter and a stabilizer. But the youth commissioners in underdeveloped countries often make the mistake of imagining their role to be that of youth commissioners in fully developed countries. They speak of strengthening the soul, of developing the body, and of facilitating the growth of sportsmanlike qualities. It is our opinion that they should beware of these conceptions. The young people of an underdeveloped country are above all idle: occupations must be found for them. For this reason the youth commissioners ought for practical purposes to be attached to the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor, which is a prime necessity in an underdeveloped country, functions in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning, which is another necessary institution in underdeveloped countries. The youth of Africa ought not to be sent to sports stadiums but into the fields and into the schools. The stadium ought not to be a show place erected in the towns, but a bit of open ground in the midst of the fields that the young people must reclaim, cultivate, and give to the nation. The capitalist conception of sport is fundamentally different from that which should exist in an underdeveloped country. The African politician should not be preoccupied with turning out sportsmen, but with turning out fully conscious men, who play games as well. If games are not integrated into the national life, that is to say in the building of the nation, and if you turn out national sportsmen and not fully conscious men, you will very quickly see sport rotted by professionalism and commercialism. Sport should not be a pastime or a distraction for the bourgeoisie of the towns. The greatest task before us is

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to understand at each moment what is happening in our country. We ought not to cultivate the exceptional or to seek for a hero, who is another form of leader. We ought to uplift the people; we must develop their brains, fill them with ideas, change them and make them into human beings.
We once more come up against that obsession of ours —which we would like to see shared by all African politicians—about the need for effort to be well informed, for work which is enlightened and freed from its historic inteltellectual darkness. To hold a responsible position in an underdeveloped country is to know that in the end everything depends on the education of the masses, on the raising of the level of thought, and on what we are too quick to call “political teaching.”
In fact, we often believe with criminal superficiality that to educate the masses politically is to deliver a long political harangue from time to time. W e think that it is enough that the leader or one of his lieutenants should speak in a pompous tone about the principal events of the day for them to have fulfilled this bounden duty to educate the masses politically. Now, political education means opening their minds, awakening them, and allowing the birth of their intelligence; as Cesaire said, it is “to invent souls.” To educate the masses politically does not mean, cannot mean, making a political speech. What it means is to try, relentlessly and passionately, to teach the masses that everything depends on them; that if we stagnate it is their responsibility, and that if we go forward it is due to them too, that there is no such thing as a demiurge, that there is no famous man who will take the responsibility for everything, but that the demiurge is the people themselves and the magic hands are finally only the hands of the people. In order to put all this into practice, in order really to incarnate the people, we repeat that there must be

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decentralization in the extreme. The movement from the top to the bottom and from the bottom to the top should be a fixed principle, not through concern for formalism but because simply to respect this principle is the guarantee of salvation. It is from the base that forces mount up which supply the summit with its dynamic, and make it possible dialectically for it to leap ahead. Once again we Algerians have been quick to understand these facts, for no member of the government at the head of any recognized state has had the chance of availing himself of such a mission of salvation. For it is the rank-and-file who are fighting in Algeria, and the rank-and-file know well that without their daily struggle, hard and heroic as it is, the summit would collapse; and in the same way those at the bottom know that without a head and without leadership the base would split apart in incoherence and anarchy. The summit only draws its worth and its strength from the existence of the people at war. Literally, it is the people who freely create a summit for themselves, and not the summit that tolerates the people.
The masses should know that the government and the party are at their service. A deserving people, in other words a people conscious of its dignity, is a people that never forgets these facts. During the colonial occupation the people were told that they must give their lives so that dignity might triumph. But the African peoples quickly came to understand that it was not only the occupying power that threatened their dignity. The African peoples were quick to realize that dignity and sovereignty were exact equivalents, and in fact, a free people living in dignity is a sovereign people. It is no use demonstrating that the African peoples are childish or weak. A government or a party gets the people it deserves and sooner or later a people gets the government it deserves.
Practical experience in certain regions confirms this

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point of view. It sometimes happens at meetings that militants use sweeping, dogmatic formulas. T h e preference for this short cut, in which spontaneity and over- simple sinking of differences dangerously combine to defeat intellectual elaboration, frequently triumphs. When we meet this shirking of responsibility in a militant it is not enough to tell him he is wrong. We must make him ready for responsibility, encourage him to follow up his chain of reasoning, and make him realize the true nature, often shocking, inhuman, and in the long run sterile, of such oversimplification.
Nobody, neither leader nor rank-and-filer, can hold back the truth. The search for truth in local attitudes is a collective affair. Some are richer in experience, and elaborate their thought more rapidly, and in the past have been able to establish a greater number of mental links. But they ought to avoid riding roughshod over the people, for the success of the decision which is adopted depends upon the coordinated, conscious effort of the whole of the people. No one can get out of the situation scot free. Everyone will be butchered or tortured; and in the framework of the independent nation everyone will go hungry and everyone will suffer in the slump. The collective struggle presupposes collective responsibility at the base and collegiate responsibility at the top. Yes, everybody will have to be compromised in the fight for the common good. No one has clean hands; there are no innocents and no onlookers. W e all have dirty hands; we are all soiling them in the swamps of our country and in the terrifying emptiness of our brains. Every onlooker is either a coward or a traitor.
The duty of those at the head of the movement is to have the masses behind them. Allegiance presupposes awareness and understanding of the mission which has to be fulfilled; in short, an intellectual position, however

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embryonic. We must not voodoo -the people, nor dissolve them in emotion and confusion. Only those underdeveloped countries led by revolutionary elite who have come up from the people can today allow the entry of the masses upon the scene of history. But, we must repeat, it is absolutely necessary to oppose vigorously and definitively the birth of a national bourgeoisie and a privileged caste. To educate the masses politically is to make the totality of the nation a reality to each citizen. It is to make the history of the nation part of the personal experience of each of its citizens. As president Sékou Touré aptly remarked in his message to the second congress of African writers:

« In the realm of thought, man may claim to be the brain of the world; but in real life where every action affects spiritual and physical existence, the world is always the brain of mankind; for it is at this level that you will find the sum total of the powers and units of thought, and the dynamic forces of development and improvement; and it is there that energies are merged and the sum of man’s intellectual values is finally added together. »

Individual experience, because it is national and because it is a link in the chain of national existence, ceases to be individual, limited, and shrunken and is enabled to open out into the truth of the nation and of the world. In the same way that during the period of armed struggle each fighter held the fortune of the nation in his hand, so during the period of national construction each citizen ought to continue in his real, everyday activity to associate himself with the whole of the nation, to incarnate the continuous dialectical truth of the nation and to will the triumph of man in his completeness here and now. If the building of a bridge does not enrich the awareness of those who work on it, then that bridge ought not to

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be built and the citizens can go on swimming across the river or going by boat. The bridge should not be “parachuted down” from above; it should not be imposed by a deus ex machina upon the social scene; on the contrary it should come from the muscles and the brains of the citizens. Certainly, there may well be need of engineers and architects, sometimes completely foreign engineers and architects; but the local party leaders should be always present, so that the new techniques can make their way into the cerebral desert of the citizen, so that the bridge in whole and in part can be taken up and conceived, and the responsibility for it assumed by the citizen. In this way, and in this way only, everything is possible.
A government which calls itself a national government ought to take responsibility for the totality of the nation; and in an underdeveloped country the young people represent one of the most important sectors. The level of consciousness of young people must be raised; they need enlightenment. If the work of explanation had been carried on among the youth of the nation, and if the Young People’s National Union had carried out its task of integrating them into the nation, those mistakes would have been avoided which have threatened or already undermined the future of the Latin American republics. The army is not always a school of war; more often, it is a school of civic and political education. The soldier of an adult nation is not a simple mercenary but a citizen who by means of arms defends the nation. That is why it is of fundamental importance that the soldier should know that he is in the service of his country and not in the service of his commanding officer, however great that officer’s prestige may be. W e must take advantage of the national military and civil service in order to raise the level of the national consciousness, and to detribalize and unite the

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nation. In an underdeveloped country every effort is made to mobilize men and women as quickly as possible; it must guard against the danger of perpetuating the feudal tradition which holds sacred the superiority of the masculine element over the feminine. Women will have exactly the same place as men, not in the clauses of the constitution but in the life of every day: in the factory, at school, and in the parliament. If in the Western countries men are shut up in barracks, that is not to say that this is always the best procedure. Recruits need not necessarily be militarized. The national service may be civil or military, and in any case it is advisable that every able-bodied citizen can at any moment take his place in a fighting unit for the defense of national and social liberties.
It should be possible to carry out large-scale undertakings in the public interest by using recruited labor. This is a marvelous way of stirring up inert districts and of making known to a greater number of citizens the needs of their country. Care must be taken to avoid turning the army into an autonomous body which sooner or later, finding itself idle and without any definite mission, will “go into politics” and threaten the government. Drawing-room generals, by dint of haunting the corridors of government departments, come to dream of manifestoes. The only way to avoid this menace is to educate the army politically, in other words to nationalize it. In the same way another urgent task is to increase the militia. In case of war, it is the whole nation which fights and works. It should not include any professional soldiers, and the number of permanent officers should be reduced to a minimum. This is in the first place because officers are very often chosen from the university class, who would be much more useful elsewhere; an engineer is a thousand times more indispensable to his country than an officer; and secondly, because the crystallization of the caste spirit must be

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avoided. We have seen in the preceding pages that nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops short, falters, and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a program. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness. The nation does not exist in a program which has been worked out by revolutionary leaders and taken up with full understanding and enthusiasm by the masses. The nation’s effort must constantly be adjusted into the general background of underdeveloped countries. The battle line against hunger, against ignorance, against poverty, and against unawareness ought to be ever present in the muscles and the intelligences of men and women. The work of the masses and their will to overcome the evils which have for centuries excluded them from the mental achievements of the past ought to be grafted onto the work and will of all underdeveloped peoples. On the level of underdeveloped humanity there is a kind of collective effort, a sort of common destiny. The news which interests the Third World does not deal with King Baudouin’s marriage nor the scandals of the Italian ruling class. What we
want to hear about are the experiments carried out by the Argentinians or the Burmese in their efforts to overcome illiteracy or the dictatorial tendencies of their leaders. It is these things which strengthen us, teach us, and increase our efficiency ten times over. As we see it, a program is necessary for a government which really wants to free the people politically and socially. There must be an economic program; there must also be a doctrine concerning the division of wealth and social relations. In fact, there must be an idea of man and of the future of humanity; that is to say that no demagogic formula and no collusion with

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the former occupying power can take the place of a program. The new peoples, unawakened at first but soon becoming more and more clearminded, will make strong demands for this program. The African people and indeed all underdeveloped peoples, contrary to common belief, very quickly build up a social and political consciousness. What can be dangerous is when they reach the stage of social consciousness before the stage of nationalism. If this happens, we find in underdeveloped countries fierce demands for social justice which paradoxically are allied with often primitive tribalism. The underdeveloped peoples behave like starving creatures; this means that the end is very near for those who are having a good time in Africa. Their government will not be able to prolong its own existence indefinitely. A bourgeoisie that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission and gets caught up in a whole series of mishaps. But if nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, it leads up a blind alley. The bourgeois leaders of underdeveloped countries imprison national consciousness in sterile formalism. It is only when men and women are included on a vast scale in enlightened and fruitful work that form and body are given to that consciousness. Then the flag and the palace where sits the government cease to be the symbols of the nation. The nation deserts these brightly lit, empty shells and takes shelter in the country, where it is given life and dynamic power. The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women. The collective building up of a destiny is the assumption of responsibility on the historical scale. Otherwise there is anarchy, repression, and the resurgence of tribal parties

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and federalism. The national government, if it wants to be national, ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts. No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government, before concerning itself about international prestige, ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein.

The Wretched Of The Earth
Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre
Copyrights 1963 by Présence Africaine
Originally published by Francois Maspero editeur, Paris, France, under the title Les damnés de la terre

Tribute to David Du Bois (1932-1983). Part 1

This tribute to Victor David Du Bois acknowledges the pioneering work by an American Fulbright student about the fledgling Republic of Guinea. In 1962 he presented his Ph.D. thesis entitled The independence movement in Guinea: a study in African nationalism to the Faculty of Princeton University, Department of Political Science, international law and relations. In the following decades he published articles and wrote book reviews dealing with Guinea.
Located at Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, the Amistad Research Center holds the Papers of Victor Du Bois “anthropologist, educator, political scientist, and art collector”, for the period 1957-1970. The Center is the nation’s oldest, largest and most comprehensive independent archive specializing in the history of African Americans and other Ethnic Minorities. An exhibition named “Empowered Women: Fannie Lou Hamer, Clarie Collins Harvey, and the Mississippi Freedom Movement”  is on display from September 16 to December 19, 2014. The show commemorates “the 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and Freedom Summer.” It “highlights the participation of women in the Civil Rights Movement by drawing on the papers of Mississippi activists Fannie Lou Hamer and Clarie Collins Harvey.

Part One

The thesis of Victor Du Bois points to the clouds darkening the country’s horizon already in 1959-60. In 1965 he authored a series of papers  titled “Guinea: The Decline of the Guinean Revolution.” Subsequent developments confirmed Du Bois’ early predictions.
Today, Guinea is a failed state, as materialized by the explosion of the Ebola epidemics. Applauding Dr Greg Spencer’s humanitarian work in Guinea, New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center institutional reminded the world that Ebola hit “desperately under-served populations.” Indeed, through 60 years of dictatorship, Guineans have been forsaken by the successive regimes. Du Bois correctly diagnosed the situation and he laid the culprit on the first leader when he  wrote:

« No one is more responsible for the present chaos than the President of the Republic. For all his admitted qualities as a shrewd and loquacious politician and a militant African nationalist, Sékou Touré has been, and is, a monumentally inept Chief of State. He has ruled Guinea by whim and impulse, using his country as a laboratory to try out experiments of social and economic development whose grave implications he only vaguely understands, and whose negative results he is insensible to, even when they inflict severe hardship on his people.»

Guinea became “sovereign” more than a century after Liberia. In 1958, it was the first French colony to gain “independence.” Yet, with Sierra Leone, these neighboring countries epitomize the failure of the post-colonial state. They suffered the plight of dictatorship and state terrorism, or the ravages of civil war and genocidal politics. In the process the population have become disenfranchised and left to fend for themselves alone. Compounding the poverty induced by a subsistence economy, the authorities let citizens languish and wither in illiteracy and ignorance. Worse, they neglect or compromise  the education system. Meanwhile, corruption, oppression, repression and impunity are rampant. Depending on foreign handouts, the “national elites” think that the foreign exploitation of mining resources will  bring about miraculous development and easy prosperity!…
From 1958 to today, that’s exactly what Sékou Touré and his four successors (Lansana Conté, Moussa Dadis Camara, Sékouba Konaté, Alpha Condé) have done to Guinea,

Du Bois’ thesis was not perfect. None is. Did he plan to review and improve it for publishing?  We may not know because, unfortunately, he died at the age of 51. But his work still reads as  a descriptive, informative and analytical opus.
After a brief evocation of the challenges Bois faced in his fieldwork,  I point out, in this first part, a couple of misses and lift an ambiguity about the Fuuta-Jalon. Next, in the second and final part, I highlight the author’s foresight and insights.


Du Bois lists the obstacles of his field research in Guinea. For instance, he found “certain peculiar difficulties”  in some primary sources. The official materials proved “in many ways unsatisfactory”. And, oddly,  he lamented about “the ungrammatical French in which many of the documents were written!”

His research was bound up by the state of publishing and knowledge at the time of writing. Hence Du Bois peruses George P. Murdock’s compilation  Africa. Its Peoples and Their Culture History. Dedicated “To Americans of African Descent” the volume is now  disputed in academic and library circles. However, I don’t think it should be discarded altogether.…  Integrated with other data sources and knowledge bases, its content has its place on my webAfriqa network and its fairly Google-ranked online library.

Open Source technologies and platforms allow the processing and distribution of massive amounts of data, information —  written and audiovisual. The “pope of African oral tradition”, Amadou Hampâté Bâ called passionately for the preservation of Africa’s cultural heritage. Unfortunately,  ethnological and anthropological training and research have considerably receded in recent decades. And Africa’s is lagging in the digital revolution, in spite of the efficiencies and unique opportunities it represents for documenting the continent’s history, climate, environment, fauna, flora, etc.

Misses and errors

 The Coniagui

Twice, the thesis misplaces the habitat of the Coniagui people. They are successively mentioned as inhabitants of Guinée-Maritime and  Guinée Forestière. Actually, they live in the sous-préfecture of Youkounkoun (Koundara) in northern Fuuta-Jalon and on both sides of the Guinea-Senegal border. Read Monique de Lestrange, Les Coniagui et les Bassari (Guinée française).
Undoubtedly, Cardinal Robert Sarah is the most distinguished and very honorable son of the Coniagui.

Read Cardinal Sarah président du Conseil Pontifical

Danseurs traditionnels Unyèy (Koniaguis)
Danseurs traditionnels Unyèy (Koniaguis). Source: M. Huet & Fodeba Keita. Les Hommes de la Danse

Cardinal Sarah holds a unique record: to each of Guinea’s first three dictators he courageously told the truth. Thus, one after the other, he reminded  Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté that absolute power corrupts absolutely. With Sekou Touré, Mgr. Sarah’s move was risky and bold, given the dictator’s repressive reflex and murderous instinct. After all, Mgr. Raymond Tchidimbo had been tortured and jailed nearly 8 years at Camp Boiro. He was the predecessor of Robert Sarah and the first Archbishop of Conakry.

Tiala Gobaye Mountaye, pioneer member of the PDG-RDA party
Tiala Gobaye Mountaye, pioneer member of the PDG-RDA party

As for Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, Cardinal Sarah flew specially from Rome with a special message for the head of the 2008-2010 military junta. Three times during their meeting at the Camp Alfa Yaya barracks he told him: “Do not kill!” Dadis nodded at each utterance of the injunction. It was in August 2009. A month later, the same captain sent his troops massacred hundreds of peaceful and joyful protesters at the sports stadium. The military and miicia also raped dozens of women in broad daylight. Political parties had gathered theirsupporters to voice their opposition to Dadis’ plan to confiscate power. Upon taking over in 2008, he had pledged to be a caretaker and transitional head of state.

Besides Cardinal Sarah’s domestic and international standing, the other notable Coniagui individuals are:

  • Tiala Gobaye Mountaye
    Pioneer member of the Parti démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement démocratique africain (PDG-RDA) in the late 1940s. He became an active political leader and held provincial administrative functions. A close ally to Saifoulaye Diallo, he ended up in Camp Boiro. Exhausted and aging he lives in Labe and  gives personal and press interviews. In 2004 I had a productive conversation with him during which he shared with me postcards and  a letter Saifoulaye wrote him in 1956, while staying in Paris as one of the three deputies of French Guinea to the National Assembly  (Palais Bourbon).
  • The late Dorank Assifat Diassény. He was my classmate at the Faculté des Sciences Sociales (Kwame Krumah class, 1972). In January 1970 we were arrested and incarcerated 4 months at the infamous Escaliers 32 of the Camp Alpha Yaya military barracks. With nine other members of the student body (Conseil d’Administration), we had written a speech denouncing the failings of the revolution in presence of Sékou Touré. The “Supreme Responsable of the Revolution” had invited us to participate in the second session of the National Council of the Revolution. With the audacity and the “foolishness” of the 20-something generation, we criticized publicly the contradictions and the demagoguery of party leaders and the shortcomings of the education system. Sékou Touré did not take it kindly. He reacted with  anger and he accused us of being manipulated —he was wrong— and that leaders of the May 1968 movement in Paris (Daniel Cohn-Bendit, et al) had written our speech. He was wrong again. In reality, as the first education and cultural affairs secretary — Assifat came second in that function — I and others had drafted, discussed and agreed on the final version of the speech. We were up until 4am that night in December 1969 on the second floor (engineering)  of the main building of the Institute. In 1971, Prime minister Lansana Beavogui told the graduating Soundiata Keita class that some members of the government wanted dead by firing squad, under the pretext of an  attempted evasion on our part.… Perhaps, Sékou Touré, himself, had that idea but was dissuaded by others! Assifat, other fellows and myself we taught at the university for a decade before we started branching out. Upon  heading the chair of the philosophy, he became director of Press Bureau at the Presidency of the Republic during the final years of Sékou Touré. Later on, he became a decade-long cabinet member in successive governments under Lansana Conté. His appointments ranged from junior portfolios (youth and sports) to senior, sensitive and lucrative positions (energy, territorial administration and decentralization, defense). But he remained welcoming even at the peak of his rise. When I visited him in 2002 at his sprawling, landscaped and developed property —with some five villas— at the foot of the impressive Mount Maneah (Coyah), he proudly shared with me that the Sose populations in the neighborhood call his compound ministriyah,i.e., the minister’s place, in the local language (Sosokui)…
    I never figured out though why him and the now Cardinal let Tiala Gobaye live old, destitute and lonely in Labe.
Dorank Assifat Diasseny
Dorank Assifat Diasseny

Présence Africaine published a review of Assifat’s study  “Les fondements philosophiques de la problématique culturelle et politique de Cheikh Anta Diop.” (1989/1-2. N° 149-150)

Samory Touré

But contrary to Du Bois’ statement, Samory was not “betrayed by one of his own people.” His domestic and external policies did him in.
Internally, his rule became intolerant and repressive in response to the threat posed  by colonial troops. In previous negotiations he had sent his eldest son, Djaoulen-Karamo, as a goodwill ambassador to Paris. But later on, the Emperor ordered the execution of the son after he felt betrayed by the excessive French sympathy of Djaoulen-Karamo.

Read Ibrahima Khalil Fofana’s excellent account of the conflict between father and son

It turned out that Djaoulen-Karamo was right: Samory’s army was no match to the French war machine. After a string of military defeats, he decided to evade engagements with the French troops. He abandoned the territory of his original Empire and began an eastward march of conquest. Practicing scorched-the-earth methods, he left a trail of misery behind and mounting opposition to his reign.

Du Bois’s thesis was prepared nearly six years before the release of Yves Person’s  encyclopedic Samori. Une révolution dyula (1968). — The table of contents alone counts some 11 pages. Otherwise, Du Bois would have probably acknowledged Person’s finding that Samori ruled successively two Empires. The first existed between 1861 and 1893. It was contained mostly  in today’s eastern and southeastern Guinea. The second Empire lasted from 1894 to the end, in 1898. It was situated outside Guinea, and  in today’s centtal Cote d’Ivoire and southern Burkina Faso.

It was during his forced migration that attacked two of his prominent neighboring rulers. First, he defeated Tieba, king of Kenedugu (Mali). However, his campaign against Babemba, king of Sikasso (also in Mali), was a war of attrition. The fortified town proved an impregnable citadel. And it inflicted heavy losses on Samori. Kemè Brèma, the Emperor’s junior brother, head of the armies and commander of the elite cavalry, was killed at Sikasso. Samori was forced to lift the siege and to move on into unknown lands and hostile populations.

Samori’s victor, Captain Gouraud, provides an account of the arrest and long escort, on foot and horse-mounted, to the French headquarters in Kati (Mali).

Fuuta-Jalon: Islam, nationhood, education, literacy, literature


Saifoulaye Diallo


 To be continued…

Tierno S. Bah

Lettre de Saifoulaye Diallo à Tiala Gobaye. 1956

Lettre de Saifoulaye Diallo, député PDG-RDA  de la Guinée française à Paris, adressée à Tiala Gobaye Mountaye, instituteur à Koubia. 1956

Saifoulaye Diallo, député PDG-RDA, 1956-1958
Saifoulaye Diallo, député PDG-RDA, 1956-1958

Download (PDF, 195KB)

Saifoulaye Diallo’s letter to Tiala Gobaye Mountaye

Paris, March 14, 1956

Dear Gobaé

I acknowledge with great pleasure reception of your letter.
Your dynamism and the democratic sentiments you foster, confirm the notion that the RDA (Rassemblement démocratique africain) embodies all the strong energies of AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française) and AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Française).

I am currently on duty as the rotating secretary of the (RDA parliamentary) group, which means that I will be able to visit in a month time roughly. I will come to Koubia and we will have the opportunity to discuss face-to-face all the standing issues in Koubia, as well as in Gaoual and Youkounkoun.

Therefore, courage, and see you soon.



Translation: Tierno S. Bah

Armées africaines, entre prédation et rédemption

Pretoria, mars 2013. Cérémonie à la mémoire des soldats sud-africains tués à Bangui le 24 mars. (AFP/Stéphane de Sakutin)
Pretoria, mars 2013. Cérémonie à la mémoire des soldats sud-africains tués à Bangui, RCA, le 24 mars. (AFP/Stéphane de Sakutin)

Le monde de la défense et de la sécurité s’occupe de plus en plus de nous. Pourquoi ne pas s’occuper de lui ?
Dans la foulée de l’insurrection populaire de quelques jours qui a acculé le président Blaise Compaoré à la démission, l’armée a repris le pouvoir au Burkina Faso, l’ancienne Haute-Volta : c’est la septième fois dans l’histoire de ce pays enclavé en bordure du Sahel où — comme ailleurs en Afrique — les militaires balancent entre leurs rôles de prédateur et de rédempteurs…

Terminons-en d’abord avec le « beau Blaise » qui, au fil des temps, et contrairement à son ancien compagnon Thomas Sankara, était devenu un relais du système « françafricain » à l’ancienne, même si le Burkina — « pauvre mais digne », Mecque des ONG — posait moins de problèmes que d’autres pays ; et que Compaoré lui-même, devenu un passionné de diplomatie, rendait des services, se comportant ces dernières années en médiateur souvent utile dans les conflits sur le continent noir : nord du Mali, Togo, Mauritanie, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée, Darfour…

L’icône Sankara

Mais cela n’a pu faire oublier ses interventions plus anciennes et plutôt déstabilisantes au Liberia, en Sierra-Leone, en Angola, avec un fort parfum de trafic d’armes, dans les années 1990. Ni bien sûr son rôle central dans le putsch qui aboutit à l’assassinat de son compagnon, le capitaine Thomas Sankara — resté vingt-sept ans plus tard une icône romantique au pouvoir aussi fort en Afrique que l’est celle de Che Guevara en Amérique latine. Ni par la suite, son entêtement — après vingt-sept années de pouvoir – à imposer une modification de la Constitution pour s’offrir quinze années de plus à la tête du Burkina : l’ambition, le tripatouillage de trop…

Lire « Thomas Sankara ou la dignité de l’Afrique », Le Monde diplomatique, octobre 2007.

Le réveil de la rue à Ouagadougou et dans les grandes villes burkinabés a d’ailleurs fait penser au « printemps tunisien » : Ben Ali et Compaoré étaient arrivés au pouvoir pratiquement ensemble. Et en seront sortis un peu dans les mêmes conditions, contraints à la fuite pour ne pas avoir compris assez tôt de quoi il retournait, et avoir concédé trop peu et trop tard.

Certains voient déjà, dans ces trois journées d’insurrection populaire au Burkina, les prémices d’un « printemps africain » qui pourrait concerner au premier chef — outre le Burkina — les pays de l’ouest et du centre, où les alternances paraissent impossibles, les constitutions toujours manipulées, les successions non préparées, les dynasties trop verrouillées : Cameroun, Gabon, Togo, Congo-Brazza, Congo-Rdc, Rwanda, Tchad, Djibouti.

Les « corps habillés »

En Afrique, comme naguère en Amérique latine, le rôle des armées reste central. Non qu’elles soient particulièrement efficaces ou pléthoriques — à l’exception de l’armée sud-africaine, la plus moderne ; des armées éthiopienne et érythréenne, les plus nombreuses ; ou de l’armée nigériane, la plus active dans l’espace ouest-africain.

[Erratum. — Depuis 2013, le départ de son contingent en République Centrafricaine a révélé la politisation et la corruption du rôle de l’armée dans la politique étrangère de l’Afrique du Sud.
Le scandale concernait notamment l’accord des présidents Jacob Zuma et François Bozizé troquant la présence militaire sud-africaine contre l’accès d’entreprises sud-africaines aux gisements pétroliers, diamantifères et aurifères de la RCA.
L’armée nigériane joua un rôle clé dans la défaite des seigneurs de guerre libériens et sierra-léonais (Charles Taylor, RUF). Mais depuis lors, la détérioration de la Fédération nigériane (kidnapping et tueries du MENDA dans le Delta, horreurs de Boko Haram au nord-est, ont mis à nu ses défaillances profondes (violence gratuite et corruption).
Les armées d’Ethiopie et d’Erythrée se regardent en chiens de faïence ou se combattent. Cette situation fratricide mise à part, les activités martiales de ces deux pays dépendent largement des plans anti-terroristes du Pentagone et de l’armée américaine.  — Tierno S. Bah]

L’armée burkinaɓe, comme celle de la plupart des Etats sahéliens, ne compte en revanche que sept mille hommes, dotés d’un matériel limité, si l’on excepte le régiment de sécurité présidentielle (que commandait en second le nouvel « homme fort » du Burkina, le lieutenant-colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida).

Mais ces « corps habillés » 1, le plus souvent issus, dans la partie ouest ou centrale du continent africain, de la matrice des anciennes forces coloniales, restent — surtout en cas de troubles politiques majeurs — un recours habituel : dans des pays où l’Etat est souvent faible, ils font figure de point fort, de communauté disciplinée et soudée, qui n’hésite d’ailleurs pas à défendre les armes à la main son statut, ses salaires ou avantages.

Nababs militaires

Dans une dialectique « gagnant-gagnant », associant le sommet de l’Etat à la haute-hiérarchie militaire, on a même vu naître dans certains pays — pour prix de la sécurité que les « corps habillés » procurent au pouvoir politique — une classe d’officiers enrichis, moitié militaires moitié businessmen, dont le sort était lié pour le meilleur ou pour le pire à celui des plus hauts gouvernants.

Dans quelques cas, on a affaire à des « militaires-rédempteurs », soucieux de l’intérêt national, de l’intégrité du territoire, de la nécessité de protéger la population : leur sens de l’organisation et de la discipline, leur technicité, leur frugalité, leur bon contact avec le monde villageois, ont pu contribuer à pacifier et réorganiser un pays, au service de la construction de l’Etat-nation. On pense, par exemple, aux débuts du général Kountché (Niger, 1976), ou du capitaine Sankara (Burkina, 1983).

Dans des cas récents (Tunisie, Egypte, Madagascar), les militaires se sont interposés entre les forces de police (compromises avec les anciens régimes autoritaires) et la société civile, obtenant — comme en Egypte — d’y jouer à nouveau un rôle politique majeur.

Dans des cas trop rares — comme l’Afrique du Sud ou le Mozambique — la refonte des forces de sécurité a été « entreprise en tant que composante essentielle d’un projet global de reconstruction de l’Etat et de transformation de la société », comme l’expliquait Anatole Ayissi, de l’Institut des Nations unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement (Unidir), dans Le Monde diplomatique en janvier 2003 (Anatole Ayissi, « Ordre militaire et désordre politique en Afrique, Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 2003.)

Messies en treillis

Mais, le plus souvent, les Etats africains sont malades de leurs armées. Il n’a pas manqué, au cours de ces soixante années d’indépendance, de « messies en treillis » :

  • Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypte, 1956)
  • Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu (Zaïre, 1965)
  • Colonel Mouammar Kadhafi (Lybie, 1969)
  • Capitaine Didier Ratsiraka (Madagascar, 1975)
  • Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisie, 1987)
  • Général Sani Abacha (Nigeria, 1991)
  • Caporal Fodeh Sankoh (Sierra Leone, 1991)
  • Colonel Lansana Conté (Guinée, 1984)
  • Général Idi Amine Dada (Ouganda, 1971)
  • Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa (RCA, 1972)
  • Colonel Mengistu Hailé Mariam (Ethiopie, 1987)
  • Sergent-chef Samuel Doe (Liberia, 1980)
  • Sergent-chef Gnassimbe Eyadema (Togo, 1963)

Plus de soixante dix coups d’Etat ont été menés entre 1960 et 2010, dans vingt-trois pays subsahariens (sur quarante-huit), a compté Georges Courade 2. Parmi les champions du genre : le Nigeria (9 pronunciamentos), le Ghana, les Comores, la Guinée-Bissau, et  le Burkina…

Ces armées sont souvent divisées (ainsi que l’a illustré à nouveau, à Ouagadougou, la difficile désignation d’un officier supérieur pour incarner la transition), et « à deux vitesses », avec des unités d’élite type « garde présidentielle », richement dotées, recrutées souvent sur critères politico-ethniques ; et une armée du tout venant, non spécialisée, mal équipée et mal commandée :

« S’il est vrai que la complicité entre le politique et le soldat a fait de certains individus et de certaines unités des privilégiés du “système”, l’état général des forces armées en Afrique est le plus souvent déplorable, précisait Anatole Ayissi 3.

Et, à côté des nantis, il existe une autre armée tout au fond de l’échelle sociale de la “hiérarchie” militaire. Elle est faite de tous ces marginalisés en uniforme, miséreux, clochardisés au cœur d’une galaxie où les privilégiés affichent scandaleusement leur puissance et leur richesse (…)

Face à la précarité matérielle, à la discrimination et à l’exclusion, nombre de ces soldats laissés pour compte basculent facilement de l’indigne statut d’honnêtes miséreux en uniforme à celui, moins honorable mais beaucoup plus profitable, de “soldat de fortune”. L’une des terribles “innovations” de l’atroce guerre civile de Sierra Leone fut le “sobel” – “soldier and rebel” –, une sorte de militaire hybride ayant la faculté d’être “soldat” le jour et “rebelle-gangster” la nuit.

Si la misère d’un citoyen civil peut demeurer un simple problème social, la misère d’un soldat en armes peut dégénérer en un défi politique propre à mettre en danger non seulement la survie du régime, mais également la paix et la stabilité de la société tout entière. Là réside l’extrême danger de la clochardisation des forces armées ».

Ennemi intérieur

En brousse, dans les quartiers, les soldats sont donc souvent craints : il leur est reproché d’être surtout tournés vers « l’ennemi intérieur », et de profiter de la population (pillage, rapine, taxes sur les contrôles routiers), etc.

Dans certains cas, des soldats massacrent, brûlent, violent, sans autre but que l’intérêt au jour le jour, l’obéissance à un chef ou à un clan.

[Note. — Ce fut le cas, par exemple, du massacre et des viols perpétrés, à compter du 28 septembre 2009 et pendant trois jours, par l’armée, les forces de sécurité et des miliciens au stade sportif et ailleurs à Conakry, en Guinée. — Tierno S. Bah]

« Les forces armées ont aussi à assimiler qu’elles ont à défendre un territoire et une nation, avant de conforter des régimes autocratiques ou d’y asseoir un des leurs ! », plaide la CADE 4, pour qui il importe de « professionnaliser » au plus vite les cinq cent mille à un million d’hommes et de femmes des « corps habillés » qui constituent les effectifs des forces de sécurité au sud du Sahara.

Dans l’immédiat, outre — pour les populations — les interrogations nées de la récupération militaire de ce « printemps burkinaɓe », cet effacement du régime Compaoré complique un peu plus le grand jeu sécuritaire au Sahel, dans lequel s’illustrent notamment les Français.

Une unité des forces spéciales françaises, avec les yeux tournés surtout vers le Mali et le Niger, stationnait au sud du Burkina : y restera-t-elle ? Sur le plan politique et diplomatique, Compaoré jouait les entremetteurs, passait les plats : qui le fera désormais ?

(Lire Le Burkina Faso, pilier de la “Françafrique” », Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 2010.)

Comme l’expliquait Michel Galy sur BFM-TV (le 31 octobre 2014), il faudra surtout que Paris, confronté soudain à la perte de ce partenaire typiquement « françafricain » et à ce « vide sécuritaire » au Burkina, « revoie son logiciel politique » à l’égard de ce pays, et sans doute bientôt à l’égard de tous ceux où se posent de semblables et difficiles problèmes de succession.

1. Les « corps habillés » (en uniforme) incluent en général l’armée, la gendarmerie, la police.
2. Les Afriques au défi du XXIe siècle, Belin, 2014.
3. op. cit.
4. Exposition itinérante de la Coordination pour l’Afrique de demain (CADE), sous le titre « Les Afriques qui se font », CADE, 2012.

Philippe Leymarie
collaborateur du Monde diplomatique et de Radio-France internationale sur les questions africaines et de défense.
Auteur, avec Thierry Perret, des 100 Clés de l’Afrique.

The Fiery Fall of ‘Beautiful Blaise’

The leader, who, for decades, avoided the uprisings that dislodged neighboring strongmen from power, finally met his political end in a fiery fall.

The last time I was in Burkina Faso was in early March 2011, when the winds of the so-called Arab Spring were howling through the northern rim of the African continent. Tunisian strongman Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had fled into exile, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had resigned, and Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi was facing an uprising in Benghazi.

But more than a thousand miles south of the Libyan port city of Benghazi, in Ouagadougou, the capital of landlocked Burkina Faso, Qaddafi was still a popular figure. A portrait of the “mad dog of Libya” hung proudly in the marbled lobby of the Hotel Laico (named after the acronym of the Libyan African Investment Company) — simply “Hotel Libya” to locals. An opulent testament to Qaddafi’s largesse across the continent, the hotel also featured a presidential photograph of the Libyan leader’s protégé, Blaise Compaoré. An alumnus of Qaddafi’s infamous World Revolutionary Center (WRC), dubbed “the Harvard for Tyrants,” Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compaoré had learned vital survival lessons from his Libyan mentor.
But while the old tricks were clearly not working anymore in Libya, across the Sahara in Burkina Faso, the old dog appeared politically secure. A couple of protests had broken out across the West African nation following the death of a student in police custody in February 2011. But at that time, it looked like the long-standing Burkinaɓe leader would weather the latest domestic storm.

On the international stage, “Beautiful Blaise” — as Compaoré was popularly called — was still going strong. The French have a term, “pompier pyromane,” that can best be translated as a pyromaniac fireman who compulsively starts fires so he can rise to the occasion to put them out. Compaoré, a former troublemaker turned man of peace, was busy playing regional pompier pyromane, negotiating peace deals in his new avatar as an “homme de dialogue” (“man of dialogue”).
In the upscale Ouaga 2000 neighborhood of the Burkinaɓe capital that spring, I was treated to a rather surreal poolside dinner with then Ivorian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro in the Burkinaɓe foreign minister’s home. Neighboring Ivory Coast was in the throes of a post-electoral crisis following the 2010 presidential poll, with incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refusing to concede defeat while the international community had recognized opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara as the winner. Soro, a former rebel leader turned former prime minister, had supported Ouattara’s claim to victory. With a 2007 Compaoré-negotiated peace deal in tatters, Ivory Coast, once a West African powerhouse, was heading for another civil war — and Beautiful Blaise was once again offering his “homme de dialogue” services to put out the latest friendly neighborhood fire. This meant all sorts of West African political and former political players were surreptitiously slipping in and out of the Burkinaɓe capital for not-so-secret discussions.

This also meant it was pretty much business as usual in this corner of the globe. The Arab Spring may have fired up the masses in North Africa and the Middle East, but Burkina Faso was sub-Saharan Africa, I was repeatedly reminded during conversations at Ouagadougou’s iconic Hôtel Indépendance, where seemingly every local and regional notable dropped in for a drink on the sidelines of a pan-African film festival.
South of the Sahara, the culture of the African strongman was deeply entrenched and assiduously imposed, I was told. In Burkina Faso, Beautiful Blaise was not about to join the ranks of the ousted dictator’s club, at least not yet. From the lush poolside gardens of Hôtel Indépendance, where tropical lizards turned catatonic under the blazing sun, the tumult in Arab North Africa seemed another planet away.

What a difference three years and a few months make. In the news photographs and TV footage streaming in from Burkina Faso over the past few days, the country today is almost unrecognizable. Ouagadougou’s Hôtel Indépendance stands ransacked and looted after protesters last week tore through the premises, where parliamentarians were staying during a session that would have amended the constitution, extending Compaoré’s 27 years in power.
In a surprising display of sheer courage and rage for a people known for their genteel disposition, protesters on Oct. 30 burned the national assembly building, preventing the controversial vote. By the next day, Compaoré had resigned. As jubilant Burkinaɓe hailed the victory of their “Lwili Revolution” (named after a bird native to the region), Twitter exploded with forecasts of a new “sub-Saharan Spring,” as graphics of other long-standing African leaders on an exit wish list went viral on social media sites.

Did the winds of the Arab Spring finally blow over the Sahara to Burkina Faso, as some commentators have suggested? Just days after Compaoré stepped down, the parallels with the Arab Spring are flying fast and hard, with terms like “sub-Saharan Spring,” “Burkinaɓe Spring,” and “Black Spring” circulating on news and social media sites.

But while it’s tempting to coin another weather analogy, we would be doing ourselves and the brave people of Burkina Faso a disservice by clumping their mass mobilization campaign with what happened on the northern rim of the continent. In the end, the Lwili Revolution is a conflagration of a domestic blaze that Beautiful Blaise ignited, but then failed to put out. The early fires were sparked in February 2011, when the death of a Burkinaɓe student, Justin Zongo, in police custody led to demonstrations against police brutality, which then morphed into protests against rising food prices and unemployment levels. Mutinies among military ranks over unpaid allowances also added to the general discontent of that time.

Justin Zongo
Justin Zongo

The seeds of discontent were sown and the protesters were undoubtedly inspired by the uprisings north of the Sahara. But the pompier pyromane managed to weather it out by dismissing his government, replacing top military leaders, and placating the army rank and file with allowance hikes. The end only came when Compaoré, with the classic hubris of an old-style African autocrat, tried to push his people to accept a term extension. This would be the final incendiary straw. In rising up against another Compaoré presidential term, the people of Burkina Faso were voicing a long-standing sub-Saharan grievance over their “Big Men” who have clung onto power by crushing or enfeebling the opposition.

The fact that the Lwili Revolution, or Burkinaɓe Spring, or whatever you call it, managed to topple an entrenched leader is also due to the fact that — and this is not something many Burkinaɓe would like to hear — France, the old colonial power, helped Compaoré through the exit door. After months during which France offered its support for a high-profile international post for the leader if he respected his term limits, the sheer ferocity of last week’s protests forced Paris to realize that Beautiful Blaise was not about to go in a blaze of glory.

For his hubris, the pompier pyromane had to endure an undignified scramble into exile. French President François Hollande has admitted that France helped ensure that Compaoré was able to leave for the Ivory Coast “without drama.” In other words, France was there to ensure that an undignified exit would be as dignified as possible. This, after all, is not just sub-Sahara, it is francophone sub-Sahara. Paris may protest that the days of Françafrique — or the opaque web of ties between France and its former African colonies — may be over.

But Paris can still pull some strings in its African pré carré (backyard), and Beautiful Blaise’s time had come.

Compaoré’s exit and the post-ouster drama are being closely monitored in other African states where the local Big Man has obliterated the opposition and amassed fortunes while crushing human rights and press freedoms.

In Cameroon, France’s old friend Paul Biya has hung on to power for over three decades by keeping the opposition on a tight leash. The 81-year-old leader currently spends extended periods abroad living in a Swiss hotel, earning himself the moniker “the absentee landlord” as his country faces an overspill from the Boko Haram threat from neighboring Nigeria.

Leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Gabon, and Benin are all believed to be contemplating some sort of constitutional massaging to enable unconstitutional term extensions.

Then there’s Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe has reigned for 34 years, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, the list goes on.…

But for those hoping the Lwili Revolution will have a domino effect across sub-Saharan Africa, Burkina Faso has also provided some early warning signals. Since Compaoré’s ouster on Oct. 31, the country has seen two military men declare themselves head of state. One lasted barely a day. On Nov. 2, the country narrowly missed having a fourth — even a fifth — leader, as a bizarre drama unfolded outside the national radio and television headquarters (RTB), where at least one person died as security officials opened fire.
By the afternoon of Nov. 3, following marathon meetings among military officials, opposition figures, civil society representatives, and Western ambassadors in Ouagadougou, it was decided that Lt. Col. Isaac Zida — the relatively unknown deputy head of the elite presidential guard — would serve as Burkina Faso’s leader until power is transferred to civilian authorities.

The African Union (AU) has given Zida two weeks to make the transfer, failing which, sanctions will be imposed on the impoverished West African nation, which has consistently sat on the bottom ranks of the U.N. Human Development Index.

The AU’s tight handover timeline reflects serious domestic and international concerns over a military takeover in a country that has seen five military coups in its 54-year history, where army men turned presidents have stayed closely connected to the military.

Seeking to placate domestic and international concerns over a military takeover, Zida told reporters on Monday:
— We are not here to usurp power and to sit in place and run the country but to help the country come out of this situation.
But his assurances did not sound very reassuring when he noted: — Our understanding is that the executive powers will be led by a transitional body but within a constitutional framework that we will watch over carefully.

Nobody doubts that the military will be closely monitoring the transitional process. The army in this impoverished, landlocked nation is so powerful, chances are that some civilian transitional figures would prefer the men in uniforms be involved in the process rather than risk imperiling the country’s fragile return to constitutional order. Many members of the country’s tiny elite hail from the same military-political background and the ties between the political and military circles run deep.

After 27 years of strongman rule, Burkina Faso’s enfeebled, divided opposition has to face up to extraordinary challenges under the watchful eyes of the military, the international community, and ordinary Burkinaɓe who showed extraordinary bravery in rising up to their entrenched president.

It should come as no surprise that during the anti-Compaoré demonstrations last month, protesters were calling for Kwame Lougue, a popular former general and defense minister who fell out with Compaoré in 2003, to take over. Compaoré, a military man himself, came to power in 1987, when the former army captain ousted a fellow former army captain, the charismatic Thomas Sankara.

Beautiful Blaise lasted nearly three decades by sticking to the time-honored survival strategy in countries prone to coups, by keeping elite divisions loyal to the presidency while ensuring the regular army did not get too powerful and threaten another military coup.

Leela Jacinto
Leela Jacinto

If the opposition does not get its act together soon, the military will feel compelled to fill the power vacuum created by Compaoré’s exit. And that would be a colossal waste of the extraordinary mobilization of this sub-Saharan African nation that rose up to proclaim, “Enough is enough.”

Leela Jacinto
Foreign Policy
Award-winning international news reporter